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ABSTRACT 
 
 This research examines whether there is a normative component to victim-
blaming.  Social norms refer to social rules or guidelines that guide behaviors, beliefs, 
and attitudes.  According to the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, social norms can 
take two forms.  Prescriptive norms identify the behaviors and attitudes that members of 
a particular culture should engage in, while descriptive norms reflect the behaviors and 
attitudes people actually engage in.  These studies used three paradigms to explore 
whether there are social norms regarding victim-blaming and whether there was 
consistency between prescriptive versus descriptive norms.  Derived from the Focus 
Theory of Normative Conduct, I hypothesized that participants would evaluate victim-
blaming as unlikeable (reflecting a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming), but as an 
effective method of evaluating victims and their situations (reflecting a descriptive norm 
to engage in victim-blaming).  These hypotheses were partially supported.  The pilot and 
Study 1 found that participants reported higher levels of victim-blaming when asked to 
present themselves as unlikeable, but lower levels of victim-blaming when asked to 
present themselves as likeable.  Contrary to hypotheses, Study 1 additionally found that 
participants reported higher levels of victim-blaming when presenting themselves as 
incompetent versus competent.  Studies 2 and 3 conceptually replicated these results 
through an alternative paradigm in which participants evaluated an ostensible third party 
based on his/her responses to a victim-blaming questionnaire.  Results indicated that 
participants evaluated a low victim-blaming target as more likeable (Study 2, Study 3).  
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However, results regarding competence were inconsistent:  Study 2 found no difference 
in competence ratings between high and low victim-blaming, while Study 3 revealed that 
low victim-blaming targets were perceived as more competent.  Finally, Study 4 
investigated whether victim-blaming influenced perceptions of an individual’s 
qualification for leadership positions.  Results suggested that potential candidates who 
engaged in low (versus high) levels of victim-blaming were perceived as more suitable 
for the position.  Moreover, low victim-blaming candidates were perceived as both more 
likeable and more competent.   
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1. INTRODUCTION
Victim-blaming refers to the tendency to ascribe blame or responsibility for a 
negative outcome to the individual who experienced it.  It occurs despite the victim's 
innocence or surrounding contextual issues (e.g., “I walked home because I was too 
intoxicated to drive.”)  Victim-blaming has been found to play a role in how individuals 
think about, evaluate, and determine responsibility for a wide range of situations (e.g., 
accidents, illness, natural disasters, sexual assault; Callan, Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Hafer 
& Bègue, 2005; Hirschberger, 2006; Howard, 1984; Williams, 1984).  Thus, after 
experiencing a negative event, individuals may be ‘re-victimized’ by onlookers who 
assume that the victim was somehow deserving, responsible, or otherwise caused the 
event to occur.  
While the term ‘victim-blaming’ may refer to outright attributions of blame or 
responsibility (e.g., “She shouldn’t have walked home alone”), it is not always this 
explicit.  Instead, victim-blaming can take multiple forms including derogation of the 
victim's character (e.g., “She’s so irresponsible, she had this coming”) or a subtler 
version in which onlookers attempt to dissociate or distance themselves from the victim 
and/or the incident (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Warner, VanDeursen, & Pope, 2012). Thus, 
in this paper, I define victim-blaming as a pattern of responding to a person that includes 
negative evaluations, negative attributions, ascriptions of blame or responsibility, and/or 
dissociating from the person as a result of their experience. 
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Victim-blaming can have very real consequences for victims.  Prior research 
suggests that the experience of secondary victimization reduces coping and well-being 
(Yamawaki, 2007).  Victims may internalize these beliefs that they were somehow at 
fault or deserving of what happened, leading to decreases in self-worth and increases in 
depression or anxiety (Grubb & Turner, 2012).  Further, victims may feel isolated from 
their community or support network, factors that are important in coping and recovery 
(Ullman, 1996).  These negative effects are not restricted to the victim, however.  Fear of 
not being believed, blamed, or mistreatment can discourage future victims of violent 
crime to come forward (Grubb & Turner, 2012), especially in cases involving ambiguity 
(e.g., acquaintance rape).  This maintains a culture of stigmatization surrounding issues 
of rape or sexual assault (Grubb & Turner, 2012).  Moreover, perpetrators are not likely 
to be caught allowing for the opportunity to reoffend. 
1.1 Theories of Victim-blaming 
Most scholarly explanations for victim-blaming are rooted in theories of threat, 
either to personal safety or to worldview.  When we encounter a situation in which an 
individual is harmed or victimized, it serves as an unsettling personal reminder that we 
could suffer a similar fate (Coppolillo, 2006; Hirschberger, 2006; Walster, 1966).  If we 
can identify what it was that he or she did wrong, then we can be sure that we will be 
able to avoid a similar experience.  Victim-blaming allows for us to reinforce our sense 
of safety by reinterpreting the incident.  Evidence supporting this is found in research 
that suggests that we tend to engage in higher levels of victim-blaming when the incident 
appears to be more relevant to the self.  For example, Aguiar and colleagues (2008) 
3 
found that we tend to blame victims more when they are more similar to ourselves or 
when the incident occurred physically close to our home or work.  These results suggest 
that when incidents occur nearer to us, they are perceived as more relevant, and thus 
more threatening, to our physical selves.  
Other explanations rely on threats to worldview.  Research investigating 
explanations for secondary victimization is frequently rooted in Just World Theory 
(Lerner, 1971).  Just World Theory suggests that innocent victims threaten system-
justifying beliefs such as belief in a just world.  Belief in a Just World (BJW) refers to 
the perception of the world as safe, stable, predictable, meaningful – and ultimately just 
(Bal & van den Bos, 2012; Hafer, 2000a; Lerner, 1971, 1997).  That is, we are motivated 
to believe that our nature and/or behavior will dictate our life outcomes and experiences.  
Good things should happen to good people and bad things should happen to bad people.  
This belief stems from the motivation to perceive the world as predictable and that the 
world makes sense (Alves & Correia, 2010; Lerner, 1977; Dalbert, 1999).  When bad 
things happen to an undeserving person, it threatens our sense of control, making the 
world feel unpredictable and uncertain. In order to restore our just world beliefs, we may 
reinterpret the situation in a way that suggests that the victim was deserving of his/her 
outcome.  
Individual differences in ideology and worldviews have also been found to be 
associated with varying levels of victim-blaming.  Personal ideology, according to 
Tomkins (1963) refers to a set of beliefs that organize our worldviews and define how 
we should behave and interact with the world around us.  He describes two primary 
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dimensions of ideology:  normative and humanistic.  The normative dimension describes 
the extent to which individuals believe that people, in general, need to be controlled and 
shaped.  People are expected to control their primary drives (e.g., hunger), motivations 
(e.g., achievement), and emotions in order to conform to societal norms and rules.  It is 
through adherence to these norms that a person earns his/her value or is ‘good.’  In 
contrast, the humanistic dimension is focused on personal growth, individuality, and 
creativity.  This perspective affords value and respect to human experience itself.  
Individuals should be encouraged to behave in ways that serve to meet their emotional 
and physical needs, regardless of one’s adherence to group norms.  
 Given that these two dimensions offer vastly different perspectives on human 
nature, it should come as no surprise that they may influence how we evaluate victims.  
In general, victim-blaming tends to be higher in individuals with a high normative versus 
humanistic ideology (Coppolillo, 2006; Tomkins, 1963; Walster, 1966; Williams, 1984).  
Williams (1984) found that individuals who subscribed to a more normative versus 
humanistic perspective were more likely to blame an individual for losing welfare 
benefits (Study 1) and for being the victim of theft (Study 2).   Coppolillo (2006) found 
that individuals with a highly normative ideology were more likely to attribute 
responsibility for a rape to the victim as well as derogated the victim more than those 
with a more humanistic ideology.  
A conservative political ideology has also been found to be linked with a 
tendency to engage in more victim-blaming versus those with a more liberal political 
perspective (Anderson, Cooper, & Okamura, 1997; Coppolillo, 2006; Lambert & 
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Raichle, 2000; Skitka, 1999; Williams, 1984).  For example, Lambert and Raichle 
(2000) conducted a study examining factors that were associated with victim-blaming.  
The researchers first measured self-reported political ideology among undergraduate 
students and then two months later, invited participants to take part in an ostensibly 
unrelated study.  In that ostensibly unrelated study, participants were presented with a 
vignette describing an acquaintance rape.  Immediately after the vignette, participants 
were asked to report how much both the assailant and the victim were a) to blame for the 
incident and b) responsible for the incident.  Results found that conservativism was 
positively associated with blaming the victim of the assault.   
Williams (1984) examined the association of political ideology on perceptions of 
responsibility for negative and/or harmful outcomes.  In both studies, participants first 
completed a measure of liberal or conservative ideology and then were presented with a 
vignette describing a person whose welfare support was terminated (Study 1; Williams, 
1984) or was the victim of theft (Study 2; Williams, 1984).   Results of both studies 
found that conservative participants attributed more blame and responsibility to victims 
as compared to more liberal participants.  Further, conservative participants were more 
likely to derogate victims, express disgust, and less likely sympathize with the victims.  
It should be noted that it is not conservativism as ideology, per se, that is leading to 
higher victim-blaming, but rather the amalgamation of underlying belief structures (e.g., 
personal responsibility, protestant work ethic, normative (versus humanistic) ideologies) 
that make it more likely.   
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These related concepts all stress the importance of personal responsibility in how 
individuals move through their world.  That is, they hold that people, themselves, are 
responsible for how they move the world and the outcomes they experience – both good 
and bad.  Thus, individuals with higher levels of these beliefs are more likely to hold 
victims responsible for their outcomes. 
1.2 Victim-blaming as a Social Norm 
Prior research has focused on the role of threat (e.g., personal safety) and 
ideology (e.g., protestant work ethic) in victim-blaming. This research seeks to examine 
secondary victimization from an alternative perspective.  Specifically, I propose that one 
explanation for why we may blame victims is that we think it is normative, and socially, 
the right thing to do.  Social norms refer to socially-sanctioned scripts or expectations 
regarding how we should behave or believe in certain circumstances (Burnett & Bonnici, 
2003; Gangloff, Soudan, & Auzoult, 2014; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000; McDonald 
& Crandall, 2015).  In cases of uncertainty or complexity, we may refer to these 
guidelines to direct our behavior and attitudes.  Thus, I suggest that, in the United States, 
we have ‘rules’ that guide how we go about thinking about victims and their 
circumstances and that these norms may stem from beliefs regarding personal 
responsibility.   
Several studies provide support to suggest that beliefs and worldviews linked 
with victim-blaming (e.g., belief in a just world, internality) may be normative in some 
Western cultures (e.g., United States, Portugal, and the France; Alves & Correia, 2008; 
Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Jellison & Green, 1981; Stern & Manifold, 1977).  Norms are 
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cultural in nature; they carry positive social value in that they describe behaviors and 
attitudes that are perceived as good or beneficial across a wide range of situations (Alves 
& Correia, 2010; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).  Thus, when people behave in ways that 
are consistent with these norms, they are more likely to be perceived positively.  For 
example, Stern and Manifold (1977) asked undergraduate students in the United States 
to complete a measure assessing internal-external locus of control.  Later, participants 
were asked to score and review their own responses, as well as review the responses of 
an ostensible other participant.  After reviewing both scores, participants were asked to 
evaluate themselves and the other participants with respect to intelligence, competence, 
stability, admirability, recklessness, and unpleasantness.  Results found that more 
positive ratings were given to targets when their score indicated internal (versus 
external) locus of control, regardless of participants’ own belief in locus of control.   
Similar results were found by Jellison and Green (1981): undergraduate students 
in the United States were asked to read the results of a ‘personality test’ of an ostensible 
prior participant and to rate this person on a series of traits (e.g., admirable, friendly, 
good, likeable).  Participants randomly received one of four questionnaire packets that 
had been completed to reflect low, moderate, high, and very high internal locus of 
control.  Results indicated that participants rated the prior participant more positively 
with increasing levels of internality.  In a follow-up study, Jellison and Green (1981) 
asked participants to complete Rotter’s (1966) locus of control measure in either a way 
to make themselves appear likeable or unlikeable.  Their results indicated that 
participants gave significantly more responses indicating internal locus of control in the 
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likeable versus unlikeable condition.  The authors suggest that not only indicates the 
presence of the norm, but also that participants were aware of it and able to use this 
knowledge to alter how they present themselves to others.   
The above findings extend to Western cultures outside of the United States.  
Instead of locus of control, Alves and Correia (2008) asked Portuguese university 
students to complete one of two BJW scales (General Belief in a Just World Scale; 
Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987 or the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale; Dalbert, 
1999) in a way which presented themselves in either a positive or a negative light.  
Results indicated that participants reported higher BJW scores in the positive versus the 
negative condition, regardless of the specific scale completed.  In a follow-up study, 
participants were presented with the ostensible responses of a prior participant, they gave 
more positive evaluations and were more interested in meeting targets who expressed 
high versus low BJW.   
Finally, Dubois and Beauvois (2005) found that three aspects of individualism 
(i.e., self-sufficiency, internality, and individual anchoring) are also normative in France.  
Individual anchoring, defining the self in regards to beliefs or values rather than group 
membership, has not been linked with a greater tendency to engage in victim-blaming.  
However, both self-sufficiency (individuals are responsible for meeting their own needs 
and navigating their world) and internality (the tendency to focus on internal rather than 
external factors when explaining an individual’s behavior and outcomes) can be 
implicated in victim-blaming in that they both stress the role of personal responsibility in 
determining an individuals’ outcomes and experiences.  Dubois and Beauvois (2005) 
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found that French participants rated targets described as more individualistic (versus 
collectivistic) more positively in terms of both desirability (e.g., likeable, honest) and 
utility (e.g., competent, intelligent). 
Together, these findings suggest that individuals from Western cultures may 
evaluate individuals who more strongly endorse belief systems or values that stress the 
idea of personal responsibility more positively; this suggests that this focus on personal 
responsibility is perceived as useful within these cultures in guiding behavior and 
interpreting ambiguous situations.  If, as prior research suggests, these beliefs are 
normative, we likely rely upon them when evaluating ambiguous circumstances, such as 
when an individual is victimized.  I propose that this consistent reliance on personal 
responsibility for victim evaluation, may have led to the establishment of victim-blaming 
itself as a norm. 
1.3 Focus Theory of Normative Conduct 
Social norms refer to culturally accepted attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.  Norms 
help to direct and guide behavior in that they illustrate what is valued and expected from 
individuals within a particular culture (McDonald & Crandall, 2015; Gangloff et al., 
2014).  Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative Conduct (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 
1990; Kallgren et al., 2000; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) differentiates between 
descriptive and prescriptive norms.  Prescriptive norms refer to societal rules regarding 
appropriate behavior.  These rules define how we should behave or values that we 
should endorse.  In contrast, descriptive norms refer to the attitudes and behaviors that 
individuals actually display.  While prescriptive norms prescribe the appropriate 
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behavior (i.e., define what should be done), descriptive norms describe how individuals 
actually behave – regardless of explicit social rules.  For example, a prescriptive norm in 
the U.S. is to drive at or below the speed limit.  We are expected – and expect others – to 
refrain from driving above the posted limit.  In practice, however, we find that 
individuals frequently drive 5, 10, or even 15 miles faster than the rule dictates (the 
descriptive norm).   
The above speeding example not only demonstrates the difference between 
descriptive and prescriptive norms, but also illustrates a key feature of these two types of 
norms:  they are not always in congruence.  Focus Theory not only differentiates 
between descriptive and prescriptive norms, but also identifies when norms will 
influence behavior.  Kallgren and colleagues (2000) investigated the influence of 
descriptive and prescriptive norms regarding littering on predicting littering behavior.  
Results suggested that norms primarily influence behavior when they are both salient 
and relevant to current behavioral options.  That is, if a norm is not focal or appears to be 
irrelevant to one’s current options, it will have little effect on behavior.  In cases in 
which the descriptive and prescriptive norms offer conflicting information regarding the 
appropriate behavior, whichever is most salient will trump the other (Burger et al., 
2010).  Further, descriptive and prescriptive norms have differing influence on future 
behavior.  As prescriptive norms reflect overarching societal values that extend beyond 
context, they are more likely to generalize to new situations.  In contrast, descriptive 
norms tend to have greater strength in producing a behavior when the environment or 
context is similar to the context in the salient norm (Reno et al., 1993). 
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Descriptive and prescriptive norms also differ in directing attention to alternate 
motivations in determining the appropriate behavior for a given situation.  As 
prescriptive norms are rule-focused, they often represent key values within a society.  
Using our speeding example, the prescriptive norm to follow the speed limit may, in 
some ways, represent a cultural value of respecting authority and/or government 
regulations.  Thus, prescriptive norms reflect the culturally accepted ‘good’ or ‘right’ 
way to believe or behave.  Individuals who adhere to prescriptive norms tend to be rated 
highly on traits or qualities related to liking or warmth (e.g., honesty, likeability, 
pleasantness); we tend to like individuals who reflect our cultural beliefs and values 
(Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).  Descriptive norms, instead, 
reflect efficient methods of navigating the world around us (e.g., “if everyone else is 
doing it, it must be a sensible thing to do,” Cialdini, as cited in Cialdini et al., 1990).   
Thus, while individuals who conform to prescriptive norms are likely to be judged 
highly in terms of liking or warmth, those who conform to descriptive norms are more 
likely to be rated highly on traits related to utility or competence (e.g., competent, 
intelligent, dynamic; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005).  Given these differences, prior research 
has relied on these distinctions in determining whether a) a particular phenomenon is a 
norm and b) whether this norm is descriptive or prescriptive. 
1.4 Methods for Studying Norms 
 Prior research has established three common methods for determining the 
normativity of a particular behavior or belief:  the self-presentation paradigm, the 
judge’s paradigm, and the legislative paradigm (see Gangloff et al., 2014).  These three 
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methods provide converging evidence for the presence of a particular norm by 
addressing cognitive components (e.g., normative awareness), social components (e.g., 
social value), and contextual application (e.g., choosing someone for a leadership 
position), respectively. 
1.4.1 Self-presentation paradigm.  The self-presentation paradigm asks 
participants to complete a series of questionnaires in a way to present themselves in 
either a positive or a negative light (Gangloff et al., 2014; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).  
When participants present themselves in a positive way, that is, a way get others to like 
them, this should reflect the prescriptive norm.  Given that prescriptive norms are based 
on underlying social values, we should like individuals more when they adhere to these 
norms.  Thus, the responses of participants asked to present themselves in a positive, 
likeable way should reflect prescriptive norms.  In contrast, participants asked to present 
themselves in a negative, dislikeable way should respond to the questionnaire in a way 
that is non-normative (Gangloff et al., 2014; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). 
1.4.2 Judge’s paradigm.  The judge’s paradigm asks participants to evaluate 
individuals based on their responses to a questionnaire (Gangloff et al., 2014; Gilibert & 
Cambon, 2003).  Participants are presented with a packet of responses from an ostensible 
third party.  In reality, these responses are created to reflect high or low scores on a 
particular construct.  For example, a participant may be presented with a completed 
version of the belief in a just world scale, which has been completed in a way to indicate 
high belief in a just world.  The participant is then asked to report their impressions of 
the person who ostensibly completed the measure.  Generally, participants should 
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provide more positive ratings of individuals whose responses are congruent with norms.  
However, by evaluating the target in terms of both competence and likeability, 
researchers are able to determine whether the target’s beliefs are more in line with 
descriptive versus prescriptive norms (Gangloff et al., 2014; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). 
1.4.3 Legislative paradigm.  The legislative paradigm is similar to the judge’s 
paradigm in that participants are asked to review the responses of an ostensible third 
person or compare two individuals based on their responses (Gangloff et al., 2014; 
Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).  However, instead of evaluating the responses in terms of a 
third variable (e.g., competence and likeability), participants are asked to determine if 
the target is suitable for a particular position (e.g., student council president, whether 
they would hire them for a job, etc.).  In cases in which participants are asked to 
compare two targets based on their responses, participants are asked to report which they 
believe would be better suited for the position.  Given that the emphasis in the legislative 
paradigm is the perceived ability of the target, this method can be used to determine 
whether a pattern of responses is reflective of a descriptive norm (due to the relationship 
between descriptive norms and social utility). 
1.5 The Current Research 
The goal of this series of studies is to investigate whether victim-blaming is 
normative. Victim-blaming is strongly linked with ideologies and worldviews that are 
normative in US culture; therefore, victim-blaming itself may have become normative 
due to its relationship with those worldviews (e.g., belief in a just world, internality).  
Focus theory of normative conduct identifies two ‘types’ of norms: those that direct how 
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we should behave or what we should believe (prescriptive norms) and those that describe 
how people actually behave or what they actually believe.  While I argue that victim-
blaming may have become normative, I suggest that the prescriptive and descriptive 
norms regarding victim-blaming are in conflict.   
In the past several years, there has been quite a bit of media attention to 
victimization.  For example, we have heard reports regarding the prevalence of sexual 
assault on college campuses (Cantor & Fisher, 2015) and the events in Ferguson, 
Missouri and Steubenville, Ohio.  This media attention may be creating a changing 
atmosphere regarding how we should treat and react to victims.  That is, the media may 
be bringing attention to the detrimental effect victim-blaming has:  poorer outcomes, 
poor coping, and decreased likelihood of report incidents.  This could be leading to the 
development of a prescriptive norm against victim-blaming.  Despite this attention, 
however, there is little evidence to suggest that the incidence or prevalence of victim-
blaming is actually decreasing. This suggests there may be conflict between the 
prescriptive norm (we should not blame victims) and the descriptive norm (we continue 
to blame victims). 
The current studies seek to explore whether there are social norms which guide 
victim-blaming, and if so, if there are differences in prescriptive and descriptive norms.  
Studies 1 and 2 used the self-presentation paradigm in order to provide preliminary 
evidence of a prescriptive norm regarding victim-blaming.  Studies 3 and 4 extended 
findings by using the judge’s paradigm in order to examine whether there was also a 
descriptive norm regarding victim-blaming, and whether this norm conflicted with the 
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prescriptive norm.  Finally, Study 5 used the legislative paradigm to further investigate 
the presence of descriptive norms regarding victim-blaming. 
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2. PILOT STUDY 
 
The goal of the Pilot Study was to provide preliminary evidence of a prescriptive 
norm regarding victim-blaming.  Prior research suggests that when individuals conform 
to prescriptive norms, they are generally perceived as more likeable (Gangloff et al., 
2014; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; Jellison & Green, 1981).  Participants completed a 
victim-blaming questionnaire and told to respond in a way which presented themselves 
as likeable, unlikeable, or were given no instructions (control condition).  If there is a 
prescriptive norm to victim blame, participants should report higher levels of victim-
blaming and more negative evaluations of the victim in the unlikeable versus likeable 
condition.  In contrast, if the prescriptive norm suggests that victim-blaming is 
inappropriate or wrong, we should see lower attributions of blame and more positive 
evaluations of the victim in the likeable versus unlikeable condition. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants.  Participants were seventy-five undergraduates from a large 
public university in the southern United States.  The majority of participants were 
women (61%) and the average age was 18.61 years old (SD=.73).  Sixty percent of 
participants identified as White, 20% as Latinx, 8% as Asian or Asian-American, 3% as 
Black or African-American, 7% indicated more than one race/ethnicity, 1% indicated 
some other race or ethnicity and 1% declined to respond. 
2.1.2 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were first instructed that in this 
study, they would not be responding “as themselves.”  Instead, they were to complete 
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questionnaires in a way to present themselves as likeable or unlikeable.  A third 
condition did not provide instructions to the participants regarding how to respond to the 
questionnaire (see Appendix A).  After these instructions, participants read a short 
vignette describing an incident in which a young woman was sexually assaulted while 
attending a party with friends.  Immediately after reading the vignette, they completed a 
questionnaire regarding attitudes towards the victim.  In order to explore potential 
moderators, participants then completed a measure of free will.  Finally, they completed 
a brief demographics questionnaire and were dismissed. 
2.1.2.1 Vignette.  Participants were presented with a description of an event in 
which a young woman was sexually assaulted (see Appendix B).  In order to maintain 
realism, the description was modeled after campus crime alerts which are periodically 
emailed to students at the university in order to inform them of recently reported crimes.   
2.1.2.2 Victim-blaming.  Victim-blaming was measured with three scales 
adapted from Goldenberg and Forgas (2012) and Hafer (2000b): attribution of 
responsibility, victim derogation, and dissociation (see Appendix C).  The responsibility 
subscale (α=.96) was made up of ten items and asked participants to assess how 
responsible the victim was for the assault and was made up of ten items (e.g., “She is 
responsible for what happened,” “I believe what happened to her was caused by her own 
behavior”).  Responses were given on seven-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree) and averaged to create a composite responsibility score (M=3.84, 
SD=1.92).  Higher scores indicated greater attribution of responsibility to the victim. 
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The derogation subscale (α=.95) was made up of eight items and measured the 
extent to which participants derogated the character of the victim.  Participants evaluated 
the victim on seven attributes using a seven-point bipolar scale.  Items were:  intelligent-
unintelligent, competent-incompetent, likeable-unlikeable, responsible-irresponsible, 
careful-careless, honest-dishonest, and modest-arrogant.  Responses were averaged to 
create a composite derogation score where higher scores indicated more derogation of 
the victim (M=4.54, SD=1.39).  Participants additionally indicated their overall 
impression of the victim on a seven points scale (1=extremely positive; 7=extremely 
negative).   
Finally, the dissociation subscale (α=.83) was made up of six items and assessed 
how much participants attempted to distance themselves from the victim.  Participants 
responded to six items (e.g., “I would consider hanging out with this person,” “This 
incident could happen to me or a close friend”) on a seven-point scale (1=strongly 
agree; 7=strongly disagree).  Responses were averaged to create a composite 
dissociation score where higher scores indicated greater distancing from the victim 
(M=4.63, SD=1.34). 
2.1.2.3 Manipulation check.  In order to ensure that participants responded to the 
victim-blaming measures in the way that they were instructed to (i.e., in a way to make 
themselves appear likeable or in a way to make themselves appear unlikeable), a single 
item asked participants to report how they responded to the victim-blaming 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). 
 19 
 
 
2.1.2.4 Free will.  As an exploratory measure, the Free Will and Determinism 
Scale (FAD+, Paulhus & Carey, 2011; see Appendix E) was included to examine the 
relationship between belief in free will and victim-blaming.  The FAD+ is made up of 27 
items designed to measure the extent to which individuals identify four sources (free 
will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability) as explanations 
for behaviors, life events, and outcomes. Responses were given on a seven-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).  Scores for each of the subscales were created 
by averaging responses on relevant items.  The free will subscale (α=.85, M=5.26, 
SD=.86) consisted of seven items and measured the extent to which participants believed 
that people are ultimately responsible for their decisions and behavior, e.g., “people have 
complete control over the decisions they make.”  The scientific determinism subscale 
(α=.65, M=3.76, SD=.84) consisted of seven items and assessed the extent to which 
participants believed that science can explain behaviors and outcomes, e.g., “people’s 
biological makeup determines their talents and personality.  The fatalistic determinism 
subscale (α=.80, M=3.53, SD=1.24) consisted of five items measuring the extent to 
which participants believed that their future and outcomes had been predetermined by 
fate, e.g., “I believe the future has already been determined by fate.”   Finally, the 
unpredictability subscale (α=.60, M=4.64, SD=.70) consisted of eight items and assessed 
the extent to which participants believed that events and outcomes are unpredictable and 
due to chance, e.g., “chance events seem to be the major cause of human history.” 
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2.2 Results 
 Eighteen participants (24%) reported that they did not complete the victim-
blaming measures as instructed.  Results are reported both with and without these 
participants.   
2.2.1 Primary Analyses.  First, a Multivariate Analysis of Variance  
 
(MANOVA) was conducted on the full sample as an omnibus test of whether there was  
 
an overall impact of self-presentation condition on victim-blaming (as measured on three  
 
subscales: responsibility, derogation, and dissociation; see Figure 1).  Results indicated a  
 
significant effect of self-presentation condition on victim-blaming, Wilk’s λ=.31,  
 
F(6,140)=18.43, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.44.   
 
 
 
        
Figure 1.  Pilot Study.  Victim evaluations based on self-presentation condition.  Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
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A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant difference 
in mean responsibility scores between the three conditions, F(2,72)=64.93, p<.001, 
𝜂p
2
=.64.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the 
unlikeable condition (M=6.06, SD=1.08) attributed significantly more responsibility 
than either participants in the likeable condition (M=2.88, SD=1.39, p<.001) or the 
control condition (M=2.70, SD=.95, p<.001).  There was no difference in responsibility 
attribution in the likeable versus control conditions (p=.855).  
 There was also a significant difference in victim derogation between the three 
conditions, F(2,72)=39.52, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.52.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD 
revealed that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=5.98, SD=1.07) derogated the 
victim significantly more than those in either the likeable (M=3.67, SD=1.18, p<.001) or 
the control condition (M=4.08, SD=.55, p<.001).  There was no difference in victim 
derogation between likeable and control conditions (p=.291).   
 Similar to the results for responsibility and derogation, a univariate ANOVA 
revealed a significant difference between conditions in the extent to which participants 
dissociated from the victim, F(2,72)=9.35, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.21.  Post-hoc analyses using 
Tukey’s HSD found that participants in the unlikable condition (M=5.50, SD=1.39) 
dissociated significantly more than those in either the likeable (M=4.13, SD=1.12, 
p<.001) or the control condition (M=4.30, SD=1.11, p=.002).  There was no difference in 
distancing between the likeable and control conditions (p=.877).   
 Second, a MANOVA was conducted that considered how participants responded 
to the manipulation check.  After excluding participants who failed the manipulation 
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check, the overall pattern of results was similar.  Results indicated a significant effect of 
self-presentation condition on victim-blaming, Wilk’s λ=.17, F(6,104)=24.70, p<.001, 
𝜂p
2
=.59.  
 A Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant difference 
in mean responsibility scores between the three conditions, F(2,54)=111.72, p<.001, 
𝜂p
2
=.81.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the 
unlikeable condition (M=6.11, SD=1.01) attributed significantly more responsibility 
than either participants in the likeable condition (M=1.69, SD=.64, p<.001) or the control 
condition (M=2.70, SD=.95, p<.001).  In contrast to when all participants were included, 
results additionally found that participants in the control condition reported significantly 
more responsibility that those in the likeable condition (p=.010).   
 There was also a significant difference in victim derogation between the three 
conditions, F(2,54)=56.43, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.68.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD 
revealed that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=6.17, SD=.94) derogated the 
victim significantly more than those in either the likeable (M=2.93, SD=1.33, p<.001) or 
the control condition (M=4.08, SD=.55, p<.001).  In contrast to when all participants 
were included, participants in the control condition derogated the victim significantly 
more than those in the likeable condition (p=.002).   
There was also an effect of condition on distancing from the victim, F(2,54)=12.04, 
p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.31.  Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants in the unlikeable condition 
(M=5.61, SD=1.44) dissociated significantly more from the victim than those in the 
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likeable (M=3.51, SD=1.03, p<.001) or control condition (M=4.30, SD=1.11, p=.002).  
There was no difference between the likeable or control condition (p=.193).  
2.2.2 Exploratory Analyses.  For the following exploratory analyses, the full 
sample was included.  Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to examine whether 
participants differed in the extent to which they endorsed different methods of victim-
blaming.  Collapsing across condition, results revealed that participants were more likely 
to derogate (M=4.54, SD=1.39) than attribute responsibility to the victim (M=3.84, 
SD=1.92, t(74)=-4.85, p<.001).  Results also found that participants were more likely to 
dissociate from the victim (M=4.63, SD=1.34) versus attribute responsibility, t(74)=-4.11, 
p<.001.  There were no differences between derogation and dissociation from the victim, 
t(74)=-.55, p=.585.   
Bivariate correlations were conducted in order to determine whether belief in free  
 
will was associated with each of the victim-blaming subscales (see Table 1).  As  
 
participants were instructed to complete the FAD+ with respect to their own beliefs,  
 
instead of attempting to portray a particular image of themselves, I did not expect a  
 
difference in the relationship between free will and victim-blaming between conditions.   
 
Results found that free will was not associated with attributions of responsibility (r =  
 
.16, p = .164), derogation (r = .02, p = .846), or dissociation (r = -.02, p = .843).  The  
 
remaining three subscales on the Free Will and Determinism Scale (i.e., scientific  
 
determinism, fatalistic determinism, unpredictability; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) were  
 
similarly not significantly related to any of the victim-blaming subscales (ps≥.221). 
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Table 1.  Correlations between scores on the Free Will and Determinism Scale and 
victim-blaming, Pilot Study 
 
Condition Free 
Will 
Scientific 
Determinism 
Fatalistic 
Determinism 
Unpredictability 
Overall     
 Responsibility .16 .07 -.12 -.06 
 Derogation .02 .13 .06 -.05 
 Dissociation -.02 .09 -.01 -.14 
Control 
 Responsibility .22 -.07 -.32 .14 
 Derogation -.17 -.08 -.27 -.22 
 Dissociation -.16 -.09 -.27 -.35† 
Likeable 
 Responsibility .31 .15 .32 .06 
 Derogation .26 .35† .32 .26 
 Dissociation .11 .17 .33 .22 
Unlikeable 
 Responsibility .19 -.05 -.23 -.21 
 Derogation -.01 -.18 .26 -.03 
 Dissociation .01 .14 .14 -.07 
† p ≤= .089 
 
 
 
2.3 Discussion 
 
When participants were asked to represent themselves in a way that was 
unlikeable, they reported higher levels of victim-blaming across all three measures 
(attribution of responsibility, derogation, dissociation) as compared to when they were 
asked to respond in a way that was likeable and when given no instructions.  Further, 
when participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded from analysis, 
results suggested that when asked to respond in a way to encourage others to form a 
favorable opinion, participants displayed the lowest levels of victim-blaming.  
Individuals who adhere to prescriptive social norms are seen as more likeable and are 
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evaluated more positively than those who fail to conform to these norms.  Thus, these 
results suggest a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming.   
One of the goals of the pilot was to test these methods and materials with an 
undergraduate sample.  Using an ostensible Clery Report appeared to be an effective 
method of presenting a victimization scenario in that no participants reported disbelief.  
However, it should be noted that a large percentage of participants (24%) failed to 
complete the study as instructed.  Thus, in Study 1, I made modifications to the 
procedure in an attempt to increase participant understanding and compliance with the 
instructions.  Specifically, the instructions regarding how to respond to the victim-
blaming questionnaire were not only presented at the top of each page, but also alone 
prior to the questionnaire.  Moreover, these instructions were written in large, bolded, 
red font in order to attract attention.  The procedure was also modified to include a script 
to be read prior to the start of this study.  This script informed participants that the task 
they would be completing was a bit different from other studies they may have taken 
part in.  
While descriptive norms were not explicitly tested in this study, there was 
preliminary evidence to suggest that victim-blaming may be descriptively normative.   
Participants in the control condition reported moderate levels of derogation and 
dissociation (although means in the control condition were significantly different from 
the positive condition only when participants who failed the manipulation check were 
excluded).  Study 1 modified the methods to include an experimental condition aimed at 
exploring descriptive norms to address this limitation.   
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3. STUDY 1 
 
Study 1 expanded upon the pilot by investigating both prescriptive and 
descriptive norms regarding victim-blaming.  While prior evidence suggests that 
prescriptive norms are associated with perceptions of liking and warmth, descriptive 
norms have been linked to perceptions of competence (Burger et al., 2010; Cialdini et 
al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993) in that they are informative and serve to provide information 
about effective and efficient methods of navigating the world.  
After entering the lab, undergraduate research assistants read a brief script 
informing participants that the study that they were about to take part in was a bit 
different from others.  Because of this, they were told that they should pay special 
attention to any instruction in red font at the top of each page.   
Participants were asked to respond to a victim-blaming questionnaire in one of 
four ways: to present themselves as likeable/unlikeable (prescriptive norm) or as 
competent/incompetent (descriptive norm).  In a fifth condition, participants were given 
no instruction as to how to respond.  Given the results of the pilot study, I expected that 
participants would report lower levels of victim-blaming when asked to present 
themselves as likeable versus unlikeable.  As engaging in victim-blaming may reflect 
cultural norms regarding personal responsibility, I expected that victim-blaming 
behavior may be perceived as an effective method of interpreting a victim-related 
scenario.  Thus, I expected that participants would report higher levels of victim-blaming 
when asked to present themselves as competent versus incompetent.  
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3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants.  Participants were three hundred and thirteen undergraduates 
from a large public university in the southern United States.  The majority of participants 
were women (74%) and the mean age was 18.65 years old (SD=1.19).  Sixty percent of 
participants identified as White, 16% as Latinx, 8% as Asian or Asian-American, 8% as 
Black or African-American, 8% as more than one race, and 1% indicated some other 
race or ethnicity. 
3.1.2 Materials and Procedure.  Similar to Study 1, participants were first 
instructed that in this study, they would not be responding as themselves.  Instead, they 
were to complete questionnaires in a way to present themselves as likeable, unlikeable, 
competent, or incompetent (See Appendix A).  A fifth condition served as a control 
condition by not providing instructions to participants regarding how to respond.  After 
these instructions, participants read the same vignette and completed the same victim-
blaming measures as in Study 1.  Finally, they completed a brief demographics 
questionnaire and were dismissed. 
3.1.2.1 Manipulation check.  In order to ensure that participants responded to the 
victim-blaming measures in the way that they were instructed to (i.e., in a way to appear 
likeable, in a way to appear competent), a single item asked participants to report how 
they responded to the victim-blaming questionnaire (see Appendix D). 
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3.2 Results 
One hundred and ten participants (35%) reported that they did not complete the 
victim-blaming measures as instructed.  Results are reported both with and without these 
participants.   
3.2.1 Primary Analyses.  First, A MANOVA was conducted on the full sample  
 
as an omnibus test of whether there was an overall impact of self-presentation condition  
 
on victim-blaming (as measured on three subscales: responsibility, derogation, and  
 
dissociation).  Results revealed a significant effect of self-presentation on victim- 
 
blaming, Wilk’s λ=.42, F(12,809.89)=26.51, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.25 (see Figure 2).  Given the  
 
significant results of the omnibus test, the univariate effects were examined.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Study 1.  Victim evaluations based on self-presentation condition.  Error bars 
represent standard errors.   
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An ANOVA indicated a significant effect of self-presentation condition on  
 
attributions of responsibility, F(4,308)=100.76, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.57.  Post-hoc analyses using  
 
Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=6.08, SD=1.53)  
 
attributed significantly more responsibility to the victim than those in the incompetent  
 
(M=4.52, SD=1.69, p<.001), competent (M=2.41, SD=1.04, p<.001), control (M=2.27,  
 
SD=1.14, p<.001, or likeable conditions (M=2.18, SD=1.08, p<.001).  Participants in the  
 
incompetent also attributed significantly more responsibility than those in the competent  
 
(p<.001), control (p<.001), or likeable conditions (p<.001).  All other comparisons were  
 
non-significant (ps≥.834; see Table 2).  
 
 
 
Table 2.  Means and standard deviations for responsibility, derogation, and dissociation 
based on self-presentation condition, Study 1.  
 
 Victim-blaming Measure 
Condition Responsibility Derogation Dissociation 
Control 2.27 (1.14)a          3.39 (.98)a 3.85 (1.26)a,b 
Likeable 2.18 (1.08)a 3.09 (1.10)a          3.52 (1.28)a 
Unlikeable 6.08 (1.53)b 5.83 (1.50)b          5.44 (1.60)c 
Competent 2.41 (1.04)a 3.47 (1.01)a 3.89 (1.28)a,b 
Incompetent 4.52 (1.69)c 4.77 (1.41)c          4.44 (1.60)b 
Note:  means within the same column that share the same superscript are not significantly 
different from one another. 
 
 
 
Results also indicated a significant difference in victim derogation between  
 
conditions, F(4,308)=52.81, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.41.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD  
 
revealed that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=5.83, SD=1.50) significantly  
 
more than those in the likeable (M=3.09, SD=1.10, p<.001), competent (M=3.47,  
 
SD=1.01, p<.001), incompetent (M=4.77, SD=1.41, p<.001), or control conditions  
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(M=3.39, SD=.98, p<.001).  Participants in the incompetent condition also derogated the  
 
victim more than those in the competent (p<.001), likeable (p<.001), or control  
 
conditions (p<.001).  All other comparisons were non-significant (ps≥.306).   
 
The self-presentation condition also influenced the extent to which participants 
dissociated from the victim, F(4,308)=16.25, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.17.  Post-hoc analyses using 
Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=5.44, SD=1.60) 
dissociated more than those in the likeable (M=3.52, SD=1.28, p< .001), competent 
(M=3.89, SD=1.28, p<.001), incompetent (M=4.44, SD=1.60, p=.001), or control 
conditions (M=3.85, SD=1.26, p<.001).  Further, participants in the incompetent 
condition dissociated more than those in the likeable condition (p=.001).  All other 
comparisons were non-significant (ps≥.149).   
Second, a MANOVA was conducted that considered how participants responded 
to the manipulation check.  After excluding participants who failed the manipulation 
check, the overall pattern of results was similar, Wilk’s λ=.27, F(12,518.86)=28.20, p<.001, 
𝜂p
2
=.36.   
A Univariate ANOVA indicated a significant difference in attributions of 
responsibility based on self-presentation condition, F(4,198)=123.79, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
= .71.  
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the unlikeable 
condition (M=6.41, SD=1.11) attributed more responsibility than those in the likeable 
(M=2.02, SD=1.15, p<.001), competent (M=2.27, SD=.99, p<.001), incompetent 
(M=5.13, SD=1.47, p<.001), or control conditions (M=2.27, SD=1.14, p<.001).  
Participants in the incompetent condition also attributed more responsibility than those 
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in the competent (p<.001), likeable (p<.001), or control conditions (p<.001).  All other 
comparisons were non-significant (ps≥.899).   
 Results also indicated a significant difference in victim derogation between 
conditions, F(4,198)=49.24, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.50.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD 
revealed that participants in the unlikeable condition (M=6.02, SD=1.36) significantly 
more than those in the likeable (M=2.83, SD=1.24, p<.001), competent (M=3.31, 
SD=1.11, p<.001), incompetent (M=5.08, SD=1.55, p=.007), or control conditions 
(M=3.39, SD=.98, p<.001).  Participants in the incompetent condition also derogated the 
victim more than those in the competent (p<.001), likeable (p<.001), or control 
conditions (p<.001).  All other comparisons were non-significant (ps≥.260). 
Similar to attribution of responsibility and derogation, there was also a 
significant difference in dissociation from the victim based on condition, F(4,198)=17.46, 
p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.26.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that participants in the 
unlikeable condition (M=5.59, SD=1.56) dissociated more than those in the likeable 
(M=3.18, SD=1.31, p< .001), competent (M=3.82, SD=1.33, p<.001), incompetent 
(M=4.49, SD=1.63, p=.005), or control conditions (M=3.85, SD=1.26, p<.001).  Further, 
participants in the incompetent condition dissociated more than those in the likeable 
condition (p=.001).  All other comparisons were non-significant (ps≥.212) 
3.2.2 Exploratory Analyses
1
.  Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to examine 
whether participants differed in the extent to which they endorsed different methods of 
                                                 
1
 In this study, measures of hostile and benevolent sexism were included to examine whether ambivalent 
sexism was related to victim-blaming.   However, these measures were not included in all studies.  Thus, 
these relationships are described in Appendix F.   
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victim-blaming.  Collapsing across condition, results revealed that participants derogated 
the victim (M=4.04, SD=1.56) significantly more than they attributed responsibility 
(M=3.39, SD=1.98, t(312)=-9.84, p<.001).  Results also found that participants dissociated 
from the victim (M=4.17, SD=1.54) more than they attributed responsibility, t(312)=-8.39, 
p<.001.  Finally, participants engaged in marginally more dissociation than victim 
derogation, t(312)=-1.84, p=.066. 
As in Study 1, bivariate correlations were conducted in order to determine  
 
whether belief in free will was associated with each of the victim-blaming subscales (see  
 
Table 3).  Results found that free will was not associated with attributions of  
 
responsibility (r=.09, p=.118), derogation (r=.05, p=.410), or dissociation (r=.08,  
 
p=.184).  When examining the remaining three subscales on the Free Will and  
 
Determinism Scale (i.e., scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and  
 
unpredictability; Paulhus & Carey, 2011), results indicated a marginal negative  
 
relationship between scientific determinism and dissociation, r=-.10, p=.067.  The  
 
remaining subscales were not significantly correlated to any of the victim-blaming  
 
subscales.   
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Table 3.  Correlations between scores on the Free Will and Determinism Scale and 
victim-blaming, Study 1 
 
Condition Free Will Scientific 
Determinism 
Fatalistic 
Determinism 
Unpredictability 
Overall     
 Responsibility .09 .002 -.01 -.05 
 Derogation .05 -.04 -.04 -.08 
 Dissociation .08 -.05 -.03 -.07 
Control 
 Responsibility .17 .10 -.21 -.33* 
 Derogation .11 .26† -.05 -.07 
 Dissociation .16 .19 -.02 -.18 
Likeable 
 Responsibility .02 -.12 .04 .02 
 Derogation -.12 -.09 .14 -.22† 
 Dissociation .07 -.29* .03 -.13 
Unlikeable 
 Responsibility .02 .05 -.07 -.02 
 Derogation .15 .20 -.14 -.10 
 Dissociation -.04 -.01 -.10 -.04 
Competent 
 Responsibility .16 -.19
† 
.17 -.18 
 Derogation .11 -.15 -.08 -.15 
 Dissociation .06 -.16 -.17 -.15 
Incompetent 
 Responsibility .11 .06 .23† .08 
 Derogation -.04 -.02 .11 .01 
 Dissociation .06 -.11 .20† .11 
† p ≤ .099 
* p < .05 
 
 
 
3.3 Discussion 
In terms of liking, the results of Study 1 replicated those found in the pilot.  
Participants in the unlikeable condition indicated higher levels of victim-blaming across 
all three measures (attribution of responsibility, derogation, and dissociation). Further, 
these results held when excluding those who failed the manipulation check. As 
prescriptive norms are associated with liking, these findings suggest a prescriptive norm 
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against victim-blaming; victim-blaming is not seen as a socially desirable response to 
victims.  
With respect to competence ratings, the patterns were similar as to those found 
for liking ratings.  Participants in the incompetent condition attributed more 
responsibility and derogated the victim more than those in either the competent or the 
control conditions.  However, there were no differences between the conditions on the 
dissociation measure.  Contrary to expectations, this pattern of results would suggest a 
descriptive norm against victim-blaming; negatively evaluating a victim does not appear 
to be perceived as a particularly competent way of responding to victims or their 
situations.  However, similar to Study 1, participants in the control condition reported 
moderate levels of derogation and dissociation.  This tendency for participants to report 
moderate levels of victim-blaming suggests that victim-blaming may still be 
descriptively normative.   
Given that a large number of participants failed to follow instructions, despite 
modifications to the procedure and instructions, Study 2 sought to explore the 
normativity of victim-blaming using an alternative procedure, the judge’s paradigm.  
This paradigm asks participants to evaluate a third party based on his/her responses to a 
victim-blaming questionnaire.  While the self-presentation paradigm establishes 
normative awareness, the judge’s paradigm gives additional information regarding the 
social value of particular behaviors or attitudes.   
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4. STUDY 2 
 
Study 2 used the judge’s paradigm in order to provide further evidence of a 
prescriptive norm against victim-blaming and descriptive norm to engage in victim-
blaming.  Descriptive norms are informative; they serve to provide individuals 
information about effective and efficient methods of navigating the world (Burger, et al., 
2010; Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993).  Thus, people who adhere to descriptive 
norms should be rated higher on traits related to competence (e.g., intelligence) as 
compared to those who deviate from these norms.   
Participants were presented with a questionnaire assessing victim-blaming that 
had been completed by an ostensible prior participant and were asked to evaluate the 
prior participant based on his/her responses.  If there is a prescriptive norm to engage in 
victim-blaming, we would expect that participants would rate packets that reflect high 
victim-blaming as more competent versus those that reflect low victim-blaming.  In 
contrast, individuals who adhere to prescriptive norms should be evaluated higher on 
traits related to likeability, as prescriptive norms reflect societal values.  Therefore, if 
there is a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming, participants should rate packets 
reflecting low victim-blaming as higher on liking versus packets reflecting high victim-
blaming. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants.  Participants were two hundred and thirty-seven 
undergraduates from a large public university in the southern United States.  Seventy-
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seven percent were women and the average age was 18.46 years old (SD=.89).  Fifty-
nine percent of participants identified as White, 20% as Latinx, 8% as Asian or Asian-
American, 5% as Black or African American, less than 1% as Native American, 7% as 
more than one race or ethnicity, and 1% as some other race or ethnicity. 
4.1.2 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were told that they would first read 
a short vignette about an incident that occurred recently.  They were presented with the 
same vignette as in Studies 1 and 2 (see Appendix B).  The vignette described an 
incident in which a young woman was sexually assaulted while attending a party with 
friends.  Afterwards, they were given a packet that showed how an ostensible prior 
participant evaluated the person described in the vignette.  They were instructed to 
evaluate this prior participant based on his or her responses to the questionnaire (see 
Appendix G). 
4.1.2.1 Evaluation Packets.  Each participant received one of three randomly 
chosen questionnaire packets that had been completed by an ostensible prior participant 
(hereafter, the “evaluation target”) in an “earlier version of the study.”  Questionnaire 
packets consisted of a copy of the same vignette as read by the participant and the 
victim-blaming measures as used in Studies 1 and 2.  Packets were completed to reflect 
high, moderate, or low levels of victim-blaming (See Appendix H). 
4.1.2.2 Ratings of evaluation targets.  In order to measure the degree to which 
evaluation targets were perceived as competent or likeable, I adapted measures used in 
research examining complementary or ambivalent stereotypes (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 
2007; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999).  Participants were first asked to indicate the 
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extent to which thirty-two traits described the evaluation target using a 7-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).  Traits reflected either competence (e.g., 
ambitious, intelligent) or liking (e.g., good-natured, kind).  Competence and liking 
composites were calculated by reverse coding as necessary and then averaging the 
responses to competence-relevant traits (α=.45, M=3.80, SD=.45) and liking-relevant 
traits (α=.70, M=3.93, SD=.66).  Participants were additionally asked to indicate their 
overall impression of the evaluation target (1=extremely negative; 7=extremely positive).             
Participants then completed four items designed to measure the extent to which 
they were similar to or identified with the evaluation target (e.g., “I would consider 
hanging out with him/her,” “In general, I identify with him/her.”).  Responses were 
given on a 7-point scale (1=strongly agree; 7=strongly disagree).  A composite score 
was calculated by reverse scoring the items and then averaging (α=.89, M=3.77, 
SD=1.46).  Higher scores indicated greater identification with the evaluation target. 
Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they believed the incident 
could happen to them or a close friend (1=strongly agree; 7=strongly disagree; M=5.12, 
SD=1.71), whether they agreed with the evaluation target’s assessment (1=strongly 
agree; 7=strongly disagree; M=3.99, SD=1.85), and were given the option to provide 
any other comments they had about the evaluation target (see Appendix I) 
4.1.2.3 Suspicion and manipulation check.  In order to ensure that participants 
completed the questionnaire with regards to the evaluation target as opposed to the 
victim in the vignette, participants were asked an open-ended question asking who they 
were evaluating when they completed the questionnaire (see Appendix D).  Participants 
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were additionally asked to provide any additional feedback they had about the study, to 
describe what they believed the study to be about, and to indicate if anything in the study 
seemed “odd, unclear, or incredible” in order to assess whether participants believed that 
the packet was completed by a prior participant. 
4.2 Results 
Forty-six participants (19%) reported that they completed the measures with 
respect to the victim as opposed to the evaluation target.  An additional two participants 
reported suspicion that the questionnaire packets were not completed by prior 
participants.  Analyses were conducted both with and without these participants.   
4.2.1 Primary Analyses.  First, a MANOVA was conducted on the full sample 
as  
 
an omnibus test of whether there was an overall impact of victim-blaming condition on  
 
ratings (liking and competence) of evaluation targets.  Results revealed a significant 
effect  
 
of victim-blaming condition on ratings of evaluation targets, Wilk’s λ=.86, F(4,466)=9.39,  
 
p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.08 (see Figure 3).  Below, univariate effects are examined in order to 
explore  
 
the influence of condition on liking and competence separately.   
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Figure 3. Study 2.  Ratings of evaluation targets based on degree of victim-blaming.  
Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
A Univariate ANOVA found a significant effect of condition on liking ratings, 
F(2,234)=14.09, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.11.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD indicated that 
evaluation targets reflecting low victim-blaming received higher liking ratings (M=4.23, 
SD=.66) than either targets reflecting high (M=3.80, SD=.69, p<.001)) or moderate 
victim-blaming (M=3.75, SD=.51, p<.001).  There was no difference in liking ratings 
between high and moderate levels of victim-blaming (p=.880).   
There was also a significant effect of victim-blaming condition on competence 
ratings, F(2,234)=4.60, p=.011, 𝜂p
2
=.04.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD revealed 
that high victim-blaming targets (M=3.90, SD=.54) were rated as more competent than 
moderate (M=3.69, SD=.37, p=.008).  However, there was no difference in competence 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Liking Competence
Low victim-blaming Moderate victim-blaming High victim-blaming
 40 
 
 
ratings between high and low (M=3.80, SD=.41, p=.339) victim-blaming, nor was there a 
difference between low and moderate victim-blaming (p=.226).   
Second, a MANOVA was conducted that excluded participants who reported 
suspicion or rated the victim instead of the evaluation target.  After excluding these 
participants, the overall pattern of results was similar.  Results revealed a significant 
effect of victim-blaming condition on evaluations of the target, Wilk’s λ=.80, 
F(4,370)=10.89, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.11.   
Univariate results found a significant effect of condition on liking ratings, 
F(2,186)=18.15, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.16.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD found that targets 
reflecting low victim-blaming (M=4.35, SD=.65) than either high (M=3.76, SD=.54, 
p<.001) or moderate victim-blaming (M=3.73, SD=.54, p<.001).  There was no 
difference in liking ratings between high and moderate victim-blaming targets (p=.971).  
There was also a significant effect of victim-blaming condition on competence 
ratings, F(2,186)=3.27, p=.040, 𝜂p
2
=.03.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD revealed 
that high victim-blaming targets (M=3.94, SD=.54) were rated as more competent than 
moderate (M=3.74, SD=.34, p=.030).  However, there was no difference in competence 
ratings between high and low victim-blaming (M=3.85, SD=.38, p=.465), nor was there a 
difference between low and moderate victim-blaming (p=.365).   
4.2.2 Exploratory Analyses.   A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted in order to examine whether participants were more likely to agree with low, 
moderate, or high victim-blaming targets.  Results found a significant effect of victim-
blaming condition on the degree to which participants agreed with the target’s 
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assessment, F(2,232)=5.14, p=.007, 𝜂p
2
=.042.  Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s HSD 
indicated that participants were significantly more likely to agree with targets expressing 
low victim-blaming (M=4.53, SD=1.73) as compared to either moderate (M=3.79, 
SD=1.68, p=.033) or high victim-blaming targets (M=3.67, SD=2.03, p=.009).  There 
was no difference in agreement between the high and moderate victim-blaming 
conditions (p=.903).   
4.3 Discussion 
Prior research suggests that prescriptive norms, what we should do, are value 
laden (Gangloff et al., 2014; Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; Jellison & Green, 1981).  
Individuals who adhere to these norms are perceived as warm or likeable.  In contrast, 
descriptive norms, what people actually do, serve to provide information regarding 
efficient or effective ways to behave.  Individuals who adhere to descriptive norms are 
therefore perceived as competent – they are perceived as effectively managing the world 
around them.  Thus, it was hypothesized that participants would rate evaluation targets 
low in victim-blaming as more likeable than those who were more moderate or high in 
victim-blaming.  Further, I expected that participants would rate evaluation targets high 
in victim-blaming as more competent as compared to those who were moderate or low in 
victim-blaming. 
The hypotheses were partially supported.  Evaluation targets whose answers 
reflected low victim-blaming were perceived as more likeable overall than those whose 
answers reflected moderate or high levels of victim-blaming.  This pattern of results 
 42 
 
 
suggests that there is a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming; participants generally 
did not perceive that engaging as victim-blaming as a desirable behavior.    
The results concerning competence ratings were less conclusive.  If participants 
perceived victim-blaming as effective, they should have evaluated high victim-blaming 
evaluation targets as more competent.  Although evaluation targets reflecting high 
victim-blaming were evaluated as significantly more competent than those who were 
moderate, there was no difference in competence ratings between high and low victim-
blaming.  Rather than addressing whether engaging victim-blaming is a descriptive 
norm, participants may have been responding to whether a respondent “picked a side.”  
That is, as the responses in the moderate condition hovered around the midpoint of the 
scale for each item.  Participants may have perceived high and low victim-blaming as 
more competent as their answers indicated a stronger opinion.  For example, one 
participant reported, “That the respondent never really selected "agree" or "disagree", 
just "somewhat". There was no concrete thoughts [sic].”  In brief, Study 2 seemed to 
provide additional evidence of a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming, but 
provided little support that there may be a descriptive norm to engage in victim-blaming 
behavior. 
Exploratory results concerning participants’ agreement with the target may 
suggest a descriptive norm against victim-blaming.  Participants were more likely to 
agree with targets who reflected low victim-blaming, rather than moderate or high 
victim-blaming.  However, while this tendency might reflect descriptive norms, it could 
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also be interpreted as reflecting social desirability concerns (i.e., it is not seen as 
desirable to blame a victim).   
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5. STUDY 3 
 
While Study 2 found evidence of a prescriptive norm to avoid victim-blaming, it 
failed to find evidence of a descriptive norm to engage in victim-blaming.  However, it 
should be noted that when using the judge’s paradigm, researchers frequently provide a 
summary of the ostensible respondents’ answers in order to assist participants in 
interpreting the responses.  Study 3 attempted to rectify this limitation by including a 
brief written statement by the ostensible prior participant that describes and explains 
their evaluation of the victim.  It was expected that evaluation targets whose responses 
reflect reliance on personal responsibility (and thus, are high in victim-blaming) would 
be evaluated as more competent than those reflecting low victim-blaming.  As in Study 
2, it was expected that responses indicating low victim-blaming would be evaluated as 
more likeable.  Further, Study 3 also explored whether the gender of the target might 
moderate ratings of likeability and competence.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants.  Participants were two hundred and four undergraduates from 
a large public university in the southern United States.  Sixty-four percent were women 
and the average age was 18.74 years old (SD=.88).  Sixty-eight percent of participants 
identified as White, 14% as Latinx, 6% as Black or African-American, 5% as Asian or 
Asian-American, and 7% indicated more than one race or ethnicity. 
5.1.2 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were informed that they were 
participating in a study about decision making and person evaluation and completed the 
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measures described below.  The procedure for Study 3 was similar to Study 2, 
participants read a brief vignette describing an incident in which a young woman was 
sexually assaulted while attending a party (see Appendix B), read the responses to the 
vignette from an ostensible prior participant (evaluation target), and then were asked to 
evaluate the target in terms of competence and likeability. Participants were additionally 
given the option to provide any other comments regarding either the target or the victim 
(see Appendix I). 
5.1.2.1 Manipulation of victim-blaming.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two conditions: high victim-blaming or low victim-blaming.  In the high victim-
blaming condition, participants read the same vignette as in the previous studies.  As in 
Study 2, participants then received a questionnaire packet that had been completed by an 
ostensible prior participant (the “evaluation target”) in either a way to indicate high or 
low victim-blaming.  At the end of this packet, the participant read additional comments 
provided by the evaluation target that briefly summarized his/her opinion and evaluating 
of the victim (see Appendix H; Appendix J).  
In order to create comments that not only reflect high (or low) victim-blaming, 
but also seem believable, I examined feedback and comments from participants in the 
earlier studies.  Comments that indicated high victim-blaming tended to state that “it 
wasn’t her fault, but…”  For example, one participant responded, “It was her personal 
decision to go up to a bedroom with the man she was talking to, and she is the one who 
placed herself in a bad position. By going up to a bedroom with this person she has only 
known for a few hours to "continue talking" she probably gave the guy the wrong idea.”  
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Another reported, “She was to quick to trust the young man . . . my question is why 
would she go upstairs to a room ALONE with someone she barley knew? I mean did she 
really think he just wanted to just talk? why couldn't She continue her conversation with 
him downstairs? Next time she needs to think about what she is doing before she does it. 
Plus, she should have never put yourself in that situation in the first place. [sic]” 
Participants seemed to stress that they were not blaming the victim, but that they 
believed that she failed to adequately protect herself, that she made poor decisions, or 
that she was naïve.  Thus, comments were created by modifying some of these 
participant comments from Study 2 in order to stress this idea of personal responsibility.  
The final comment read:  
The girl voluntarily went into the bedroom with this suspect. How is she not in 
some sort of way to blame? Yes, she did not know this was going to happen, but 
she made the decision to go upstairs.  I believe that she put herself into a 
situation that never has good outcomes.  I don’t think that anyone deserves 
something like that, but she did kind of ask for it. 
Low victim-blaming comments focused on themes of consent and holding men, 
rather than women, responsible for sexual assault.  For example, “We are, in reality, 
trying to make women responsible for the event and teaching them how to avoid them 
rather than teaching others not to commit these actions [sic].”  Another participant 
commented, “Just because the girl went upstairs so they could talk did NOT give that 
man permission to have sex with her.”  As with the high victim-blaming condition, the 
 47 
 
 
target’s comments were crafted by modifying responses of prior participants.  The final 
comment read: 
The girl voluntarily went into the bedroom with this suspect. But, she is not in 
any way to blame. She did not know this was going to happen, even though she 
made the decision to go upstairs.  I believe that he put her into a situation that 
never has good outcomes.  I don’t think that anyone deserves something like that. 
She bears no responsibility for the incident. 
 5.1.2.2 Manipulation of gender.  In order to manipulate the ostensible gender of 
the evaluation target, a demographics questionnaire was included at the end of the 
completed victim-blaming packets (see Appendix K).  Packets either identified the 
evaluation target as male or female.  The remaining demographic characteristics (i.e., 
age, race/ethnicity, and year in school) were held constant.   
5.1.2.3 Ratings of evaluation targets.  Participants evaluated targets in the same 
way as in Study 3 (see Appendix I).  Participants indicated the extent to which thirty-two 
traits reflecting either competence (e.g., ambitious, intelligent) or liking (e.g., good-
natured, kind) describe the evaluation target using a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree; Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 1999).  Composite competence and 
likeability scores were calculated by reverse-coding as necessary and then averaging the 
responses.  After rating targets on each trait, participants were asked to indicate their 
overall impression of the target (1=extremely negative; 7=extremely positive), the extent 
to which they believed that a similar incident could happen to them or a close friend 
(1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree), and the degree to which they agreed with the 
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target’s evaluation (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).  Finally, participants were 
given the option to provide any other comments they have regarding either the target or 
the victim. 
5.1.2.4 Suspicion and manipulation check.  In order to ensure that participants 
completed the dependent measures with respect to the evaluation target as opposed to the 
victim, participants were asked an open-ended question asking who their evaluation 
applies to (see Appendix D).  In order to probe for suspicion, participants were then 
additionally asked to provide any additional feedback they have about the study, to 
describe what they believed the study to be about, and to indicate if anything in the study 
seemed “odd, unclear, or incredible.” 
5.2 Results 
Twenty-three participants (11%) reported that they evaluated the victim as 
opposed to the ostensible prior participant.  An additional four reported suspicion that 
the questionnaire packets were not completed by prior participants.  Analyses were 
conducted both with and without these participants.  
5.2.1 Primary Analyses.  First, a MANOVA was conducted on the full sample 
as an omnibus test of whether there was an overall impact of victim-blaming condition 
or the gender of the evaluation target on ratings (liking and competence) of evaluation 
targets (see Figure 4). Results revealed a significant main effect of victim-blaming 
condition, Wilk’s λ=.58, F(2,199)=72.72, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.42.  The main effect of gender 
(Wilk’s λ=.99, F(2,199)=.74, p=.477, 𝜂p
2
=.01) and the interaction between victim-blaming 
and gender (Wilk’s λ=.98, F(2,199)=2.23, p=.111, 𝜂p
2
=.02) were both non-significant.   
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Figure 4. Study 3.  Ratings of evaluation targets based on degree of victim-blaming and 
target gender.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
Next, the univariate analyses for both liking and competence were examined.  A 
Univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of victim-blaming condition on 
liking ratings, F(1,200)=145.47, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.421.  Evaluation targets reflecting low 
victim-blaming were rated as more likeable (M=5.25, SD=.56) as compared to those 
reflecting high victim-blaming (M=3.97, SD=.92).  There was not a significant main 
effect of target gender on likeability, F(1,200)=1.11, p=.294, 𝜂p
2
=.01, nor was there a 
significant interaction between gender and victim-blaming, F(1,200)=.18, p=.669, 𝜂p
2
<.01.  
There was also a significant effect of victim-blaming condition on competence 
ratings, F(1,200)=41.50, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.17.  Evaluation targets reflecting low victim-blaming 
(M=4.57, SD=.60) were evaluated as more competent than those indicating high victim-
blaming (M=4.02, SD=.62).  Target gender did not significantly influence competence 
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ratings, F(1,200)=.002, p=.963, 𝜂p
2
<.001.  However, there was a significant interaction 
between target gender and victim-blaming condition, F(1,200)=4.11, p=.044, 𝜂p
2
=.02.  
Tests of simple effects indicated that women who were low in victim-blaming (M=4.49, 
SD=.68) were rated as significantly more competent than those high in victim-blaming 
(M=4.11, SD=.68; F(1,200)=9.75, p=.002, 𝜂p
2
=.05).  Similarly, men low in victim-blaming 
(M=4.65, SD=.50) were rated as significantly more competent than those high in victim-
blaming (M=3.94, SD=.54; F(1,200)=35.86, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.15).  While the pattern of results 
was similar for female and male evaluation targets, an examination of the effect sizes 
indicated that the influence of victim-blaming on competence ratings had a greater effect 
for male versus female evaluation targets.  Tests of simple effects also revealed that in 
the low victim-blaming condition, there was not a significant effect of gender on 
competence ratings, F(1,200)=1.96, p=.163, 𝜂p
2
=.01.  In the high victim-blaming 
condition, there was again was no significant effect of gender on competence ratings, 
F(1,200)=2.15, p=.144, 𝜂p
2
=.01. 
Second, a MANOVA was conducted that considered how participants responded 
to the manipulation check and whether they expressed suspicion.  After excluding these 
participants from analysis, the overall pattern of results was similar.  Results revealed a 
significant main effect of victim-blaming condition on ratings of evaluation targets, 
Wilk’s λ=.54, F(2,172)=72.38, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.46.  The main effect of target gender (Wilk’s 
λ=.98, F(2,172)=1.43, p=.241, 𝜂p
2
=.02 and the interaction between victim-blaming and 
gender (Wilk’s λ=.98, F(2,172)=1.66, p=.192, 𝜂p
2
=.02) were both non-significant.   
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A Univariate ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect of 
victim-blaming condition on liking ratings, F(1,173)=143.54, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.45.  Low 
victim-blaming targets (M=5.28, SD=.48) were evaluated as more likeable than high 
victim-blaming targets (M=3.96, SD=.93). There was a marginal effect of target gender 
on liking ratings, F(1,173)=2.86, p=.093, 𝜂p
2
=.02.  Male targets (M=4.72, SD=.96) were 
evaluated marginally more likable than female targets (M=4.55, SD=1.01).  The 
interaction between victim-blaming and target gender was non-significant, F(1,173)=.27, 
p=.606, 𝜂p
2
=.61.     
There was also a significant main effect of victim-blaming condition on 
competence ratings, F(1,173)=42.15, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.20.  The main effect of target gender 
was non-significant, F(1,173)=.34, p=.562, 𝜂p
2
<.01. The interaction between victim-
blaming and target gender was marginal, F(1,173)=3.26, p=.073, 𝜂p
2
=.02.  Although the 
interaction did not reach traditional significance, as it had when all participants were 
included, tests of simple effects were conducted in order to examine the pattern of 
results.  Women who were low in victim-blaming (M=4.47, SD=.70) were rated as 
significantly more competent than those high in victim-blaming (M=4.04, SD=.72; 
F(1,173)=10.47, p=.001, 𝜂p
2
=.06).  Similarly, men low in victim-blaming (M=4.69, 
SD=.46) were rated as significantly more competent than those high in victim-blaming 
(M=3.92, SD=.53; F(1,173)=35.97, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.17).  While the pattern of results was 
similar for female and male evaluation targets, an examination of the effect sizes 
indicated that the influence of victim-blaming on competence ratings had a greater effect 
for male versus female evaluation targets.  In contrast with when all participants were 
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included in analyses, tests of simple effects also revealed that in the low victim-blaming 
condition, there was a marginal effect of gender on competence ratings, F(1,173)=3.47, 
p=.064, 𝜂p
2
=.02.  Men (M=4.69, SD=.46) were rated as marginally more competent as 
compared to women (M=4.47, SD=.70).  In the high victim-blaming condition, there was 
again was no significant effect of gender on competence ratings, F(1,200)=1.15, p=.286, 
𝜂p
2
=.01. 
5.2.2 Exploratory Analyses
2
.  An independent samples t-test was conducted in 
order to examine whether participants were more likely to agree with low or high victim-
blaming targets.  Results found a significant effect of victim-blaming condition on the 
degree to which participants agreed with the target’s assessment, t(201)=10.98, p<.001, 
d=1.54.  Participants agreed more with targets reflecting low victim-blaming (M=5.22, 
SD=1.70) versus those reflecting high victim-blaming (M=2.46, SD=1.87).     
5.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 3 partially replicated those of Study 2.  Low victim-blaming 
targets were evaluated as more likeable, providing further evidence of a prescriptive 
norm against engaging in victim-blaming.  While Study 2 found no difference in 
competence ratings between high and low victim-blamers, Study 3 found that low 
victim-blaming targets were also perceived as more competent than high victim-blamers.  
As descriptive norms are associated with competence, this might suggest a descriptive 
norm against victim-blaming.   
                                                 
2
 In this study, measures of hostile and benevolent sexism were included to examine whether results were 
moderated by these individual differences.  Due to programming error, these measures were not collected 
for all participants. Thus, these relationships are described in Appendix L.   
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 Study 3 also explored whether the gender of a target in combination with the 
level of victim-blaming might influence others’ evaluations.  While the target’s gender 
did not influence liking evaluations, it did influence perceptions of competence.  Low 
levels of victim-blaming were associated with greater competence; however, this 
relationship was stronger for men versus women.   While both men and women can 
experience sexual assault, women are disproportionately affected (Breiding et al., 2014).  
As the prevalence is much higher for women, issues related to sexual assault may be 
perceived as primarily a “women’s issue.”  Thus, women may be expected to respond 
more empathetically to survivors and may not receive the same ‘boost’ in competence 
ratings that men might receive for avoiding victim-blaming.   
 Studies 2 and 3 attempted to evaluate whether high or low victim-blaming were 
perceived as competent.  However, participants were asked to evaluate competence for 
an individual more generally.  Study 4 used a different paradigm that asked participants 
to evaluate a third party’s responses to a victim-blaming questionnaire when competence 
was more relevant.  Specifically, we asked participants to evaluate potential candidates 
for a leadership position within a student organization.   
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6. STUDY 4 
 
 Study 4 aimed to find evidence of a descriptive norm of victim-blaming through 
the legislative paradigm.  The legislative paradigm is similar to the judge’s paradigm in 
that it asks participants to evaluate an ostensible prior participant based on his/her 
responses to a questionnaire.  However, it differs in that instead of rating the respondent 
in terms of warmth and competence, participants were asked to determine whether the 
respondent is a suitable candidate for a job, position in government, or other leadership 
position.  To be successful in these types of positions, candidates should be highly 
competent and be willing and able to make appropriate and effective decisions.  Thus, 
participants should be more likely to select and approve of candidates they perceive as 
highly competent.  If there is a descriptive norm to engage in victim-blaming, 
participants should show greater support for candidates reflecting high versus low 
victim-blaming. 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants.  Participants were 175 undergraduates from a large public 
university in the southern United States.  Sixty-nine percent were women and the 
average age was 19.14 years old (SD=1.00).  Fifty-four percent of participants identified 
as White, 26% as Latinx, 7% as Asian or Asian-American, 3% as Black or African 
American, 9% indicated more than one race or ethnicity, and 1% declined to report. 
6.1.2 Materials and Procedure.  Participants were informed that they would be 
participating in a study investigating how individuals are selected for leadership 
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positions. Participants first received a description of an open student government 
position, including primary duties, and skills and qualifications that an ideal candidate 
would possess.  Participants then received the application materials from an ostensible 
potential candidate including a resume and results of a “decision-making” survey 
designed to assess how individuals think about and evaluate difficult situations.  After 
reading over these materials, participants evaluated the candidate in terms of how 
suitable, qualified, and successful the candidate is likely to be. 
6.1.2.1 Application packets.  Participants were instructed that they would be 
taking part in a study investigating how individuals for leadership positions are chosen.  
They received a copy of an application packet of an individual seeking the position of 
Chief Justice of the Texas A&M University’s Judicial Court (see Appendix M). 
 The first page of the application packet described the position of Chief Justice, as 
well as the role of the Judiciary Court.  Participants then saw the resume of one of the 
potential nominees describing his/her qualifications and educational experience.  Finally, 
participants saw a completed ‘decision-making’ questionnaire that the ostensible 
nominees have completed.  Participants were told that potential nominees have been 
asked to complete these questionnaires as a method of allowing members of the Student 
Senate to evaluate how nominees go about thinking about and evaluating difficult and 
ambiguous scenarios.  These packets were made up of two scenarios: the Heinz 
Dilemma (distractor task) and a victim-blaming scenario (target task).  The Heinz 
Dilemma (Kohlberg, 1958) describes an incident in which a young man steals a drug in 
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order to save his wife from cancer.  The second scenario consisted of the same vignette 
and questionnaire as used in the previous studies. 
6.1.2.2 Manipulation of victim-blaming.  Victim-blaming was manipulated in 
the same way as in Studies 3 and 4 (see Appendix H).  As part of the potential nominee’s 
application packet, participants received a completed victim-blaming questionnaire that 
indicated either high or low victim-blaming.   
6.1.2.3 Manipulation of candidate quality.  In order to determine whether the 
candidate’s perceived quality moderated participant evaluations, two versions of the 
candidate’s resume were created.  One reflected relatively high quality (e.g., high grade 
point average, relevant experience), while the other reflected a lower quality (e.g., 
moderate grade point average, no relevant experience).   
 6.1.2.4 Evaluation of potential nominees.  After reviewing the application 
packet, participants evaluated the competence of the nominee by responding to eight 
questions regarding his/her suitability for the position of Chief Justice of the Texas 
A&M Judiciary Court (see Appendix N).  Example items include: “How suitable do you 
think this potential nominee would be for the position of Chief Justice?”, “How 
successful do you think this potential nominee would be if he/she were elected to the 
position of Chief Justice?”, and “Would you support the nomination of this person to the 
position of Chief Justice?” Responses were given on a 7-point scale, where higher scores 
indicate more perceived competence.  A composite score was created by averaging the 
responses to all eight items (α=.96, M=4.89, SD=1.44). 
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 Participants also completed the same measures of liking (α=.94, M=4.79, 
SD=.96) and competence (α=.87, M=5.12, SD=.69) as in the previous studies.  Finally, 
participants were asked to provide any additional comments they would like to make in 
an open-response format. 
6.2 Results 
Fifteen participants (9%) indicated that they did not follow the instructions and 
an additional three reported suspicion that the applications were not from an actual 
applicant.  Results are reported both with and without these participants.   
First, a two-way MANOVA was conducted on the full sample as an omnibus test  
 
of whether there was an overall effect of victim-blaming and candidate quality on  
 
evaluations of suitability, competence, and likeability.  Results revealed a significant  
 
main effect of victim-blaming, Wilk’s λ=.67, F(3,169)=27.57, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.33 (see Figure  
 
5).  There was also a significant main effect of candidate quality, Wilk’s λ=.67,  
 
F(3,169)=28.19, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.33 (see Figure 5).  The interaction between victim-blaming  
 
and candidate quality was non-significant, Wilk’s λ=.98, F(3,169)=1.06, p=.366, 𝜂p
2
=.02.   
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Figure 5. Study 4.  Evaluations of candidates based on degree of victim-blaming and 
quality.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
 
A Univariate ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of victim-blaming on 
ratings of suitability, F(1,171)=40.83, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.19.  The low victim-blaming candidate 
(M=5.47, SD=.94) was evaluated as more suitable than the high victim-blaming 
candidate (M=4.32, SD=1.56).  The main effect of candidate quality was also significant, 
F(1,171)=39.76, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.19.  The high-quality candidate (M=5.45, SD=1.26) was 
evaluated as more suitable than the low-quality candidate (M=4.30, SD=1.33).  The 
interaction between victim-blaming and candidate quality was marginal, F(1,171)=2.81, 
p=.096, 𝜂p
2
=.02.   
Although the interaction did not reach traditional significance, tests of simple 
effects were conducted to determine the pattern of results.  Tests of simple effects 
indicated that in the low-quality condition, the low victim-blaming candidate (M=5.04, 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Low quality High quality Low quality High quality Low quality High quality
Suitability Liking Competence
Low victim-blaming High victim-blaming
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SD=.96) was rated as significantly more suitable than the high victim-blaming candidate 
(M=3.62, SD=1.27; F(1,171)=34.39, p<.01, 𝜂p
2
=.17.  A similar effect was found in the 
high-quality condition.  The low victim-blaming candidate (M=5.86, SD=.75) was 
evaluated as significantly more suitable than the high victim-blaming candidate 
(M=5.03, SD=1.53 F(1,171)=11.66, p=.001, 𝜂p
2
=.06.  
Results also revealed that in the low victim-blaming condition, the high-quality 
candidate (M=5.86, SD=.75) was evaluated as significantly more suitable than the low-
quality candidate (M=5.04, SD=.96; F(1,171)=11.97, p=.001, 𝜂p
2
=.07.  Similarly, in the 
high victim-blaming condition, the high-quality candidate (M=5.03, SD=1.53) was rated 
as significantly more competent than the low-quality candidate (M=3.62, SD=1.27; 
F(1,171)=33.01, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.16).     
There was also a significant main effect of victim-blaming on liking ratings, 
F(1,171)=80.06, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.32.  The low victim-blaming candidate (M=5.29, SD=.71) 
was rated as more likeable than the high victim-blaming candidate (M=4.24, SD=.84).  
Neither the main effect of candidate quality (F(1,171)=.03, p=.869, 𝜂p
2
<.01), nor the 
interaction were significant (F(1,171)=.39, p=.532, 𝜂p
2
<.01). 
Similar to the results for suitability and liking, a univariate ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect on competence ratings, F(1,171)=10.44, p=.001, 𝜂p
2
=.06.  The low 
victim-blaming candidate (M=5.29, SD=.63) was rated as more competent than the high 
low victim-blaming candidate (M=4.96, SD=.77).  There was also a significant main 
effect of candidate quality, F(1,171)=38.45, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.18.  The high-quality candidate 
(M=5.42, SD=.59) was rated as significantly more competent than the low-quality 
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candidate (M=4.81, SD=.72).  The interaction between victim-blaming and candidate 
quality was not significant, F(1,171)=1.21, p=.272, 𝜂p
2
=.01.   
Next, a two-way MANOVA was conducted that took participants’ responses to 
the manipulation check into consideration.  After excluding participants who did not 
follow instructions or who reported suspicion, the pattern of results was similar.  Results 
revealed a significant main effect of victim-blaming (Wilk’s λ=.63, F(1,151)=29.22, 
p<.001, 𝜂p
2=.37) and of candidate quality (Wilk’s λ=.71, F(1,151)=20.82, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.29).  
The two-way interaction was not significant, Wilk’s λ=.99, F(1,151)=.54, p=.654, 𝜂p
2
=.01.    
 A Univariate ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of victim-blaming on 
ratings of suitability, F(1,153)=39.31, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.20.  The low victim-blaming candidate 
(M=5.51, SD=.94) was evaluated as more suitable than the high victim-blaming 
candidate (M=4.28, SD=1.58).  The main effect of candidate quality was also significant, 
F(1,153)=29.03, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.16.  The high-quality candidate (M=5.43, SD=1.31) was 
evaluated as more suitable than the low-quality candidate (M=4.36, SD=1.36).  In 
contrast to when all participants were included in analyses, the interaction between 
victim-blaming and candidate quality was non-significant, F(1,153)=1.35, p=.247, 𝜂p
2
=.01.   
There was also a significant main effect of victim-blaming on liking ratings, 
F(1,153)=80.90, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.35.  The low victim-blaming candidate (M=5.36, SD=.67) 
was rated as more likeable than the high victim-blaming candidate (M=4.23, SD=.88).  
Neither the main effect of candidate quality (F(1,153)<.01, p=.967, 𝜂p
2
<.01), nor the 
interaction were significant (F(1,153)=.18, p=.671, 𝜂p
2
<.01).  
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There was also a significant main effect of victim-blaming on competence 
ratings, F(1,153)=8.02, p=.005, 𝜂p
2
=.05.  The low victim-blaming candidate (M=5.27, 
SD=.61) was rated as more competent than the high low victim-blaming candidate 
(M=4.97, SD=.73).  The main effect of candidate quality was also significant, 
F(1,153)=23.30, p<.001, 𝜂p
2
=.13.  The high-quality candidate (M=5.37, SD=.58) was rated 
as significantly more competent than the low-quality candidate (M=4.87, SD=.70).  The 
interaction between victim-blaming and candidate quality was not significant, 
F(1,153)=.60, p=.442, 𝜂p
2
<.01.  
6.3 Discussion 
Study 4 used an alternate paradigm to evaluate the perceived competence of 
victim-blaming behavior.  Participants were asked to evaluate a potential candidate for 
the position of Chief Justice for their university’s judicial court.  It would be expected 
that in order for an individual to be successful in leadership positions such as these, they 
should be highly competent.  As descriptive norms are associated with competence, 
participant evaluations of a candidate expressing either high or low victim-blaming 
should provide information regarding descriptive norms regarding victim-blaming.   
Results suggested a descriptive norm against victim-blaming.  Participants 
evaluated a low victim-blaming candidate as more suitable as compared to a high victim-
blaming candidate.  Interestingly, while this pattern was found for both high and low-
quality candidates, the degree to which the candidate engaged in victim-blaming 
behavior had a stronger effect in the low-quality condition.  Thus, the degree to which 
individual’s seeking leadership positions endorse victim-blaming behavior and/or 
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attitudes may influence support for their candidacy.  However, people may primarily 
rely on other information (e.g., experience) to determine an individual’s competency or 
suitability for the position.   
Evaluations of candidate competence also suggested a descriptive norm against 
victim-blaming.  Participants evaluated the low victim-blaming candidate as 
significantly more competent than the high victim-blaming candidate.  Finally, Study 4 
provided additional evidence of a prescriptive norm against victim-blaming, consistent 
with Studies 2 and 3.  Low victim-blaming was perceived as more likeable than high 
victim-blaming.   
With respect to candidate quality, results were as expected.  Participants rated the 
high-quality candidate as more suitable and competent as compared to the low-quality 
candidate.  Candidate quality did not have an effect on liking ratings; high quality 
candidates were not merely rated more positively overall.  This suggests that candidates’ 
likeability is distinct from their perceived ability to be successful in a particular position.  
That is, being highly qualified does not imply that an individual will also be perceived as 
likeable.    
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research used three paradigms to investigate whether there is a normative 
component to victim-blaming and to explore whether prescriptive (what we should do) 
and descriptive (what we actually do) norms were congruent.  In the first paradigm, 
participants were asked to complete a victim-blaming questionnaire in such a way as to 
present a positive impression (i.e., likeable or competent), negative impression (i.e., 
unlikeable or incompetent), or were given no instructions on how to respond.  In the 
second paradigm, participants were asked to evaluate a third party based on his/her 
responses to a victim-blaming questionnaire.  In the third, final paradigm, participants 
were asked to not only evaluate a third party based on his responses, but to also indicate 
whether he would be a suitable candidate for a leadership position.  The primary 
hypotheses were generated based on prior research suggesting that prescriptive and 
descriptive norms are related to likeability and effective behavior, respectively (Alves & 
Correia, 2008; Cialdini et al., 1990; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Gilibert & Cambon, 
2003).  Thus, conditions which asked participants to respond in a (un)likeable way (Pilot 
Study, Study 1) and evaluations of likeability (Studies 2, 3, and 4) were expected to 
provide information regarding prescriptive norms surrounding victim-blaming.  In 
contrast, conditions which asked participants to present as (in)competent (Study 1) and 
evaluations of competence (Studies 2, 3, and 4) and suitability for a leadership position 
(Study 4) were expected to provide information regarding descriptive norms.  Overall, 
results of these studies suggest that victim-blaming is counter to broad, social values 
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(indicating a prescriptive norm against victim-blaming) and that individuals who engage 
in victim-blaming are not perceived as demonstrating a useful interpretation of the event 
(indicating a descriptive norm against victim-blaming).   
With respect to prescriptive norms, low levels of victim-blaming were associated 
with greater liking across all five studies.  The Pilot and Study 1 found that when 
participants were asked to present themselves as likeable, they reported lower levels of 
victim-blaming than when asked to present themselves as unlikeable.  Further, 
participants in the likeable condition also reported lower victim-blaming than in a 
control condition in which they received no instruction on how to respond.  These 
findings not only suggest that victim-blaming is prescriptively counter-normative, but 
that participants were aware of this norm and able to use this information to manage 
their impression on others.  Studies 2 and 3 found that participants also rated a third 
party as more likeable when he/she completed a victim-blaming questionnaire in such a 
way that reflected low, rather than high (or moderate; Study 2), victim-blaming.  Finally, 
Study 4 found that a student applying for a leadership position for a student organization 
(i.e., university judicial court) was evaluated as more likeable when he indicated low 
(versus high) levels of victim-blaming on questionnaire.  Together, these results suggest 
that victim-blaming is perceived as socially undesirable and prescriptively counter-
normative.   
With the exception of Study 2, which found that victim-blaming did not 
influence competence ratings, the overall pattern of results across studies suggested a 
descriptive norm against victim-blaming.  Study 1 found that when participants were 
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asked to present themselves as incompetent, they attributed more responsibility and 
derogated a sexual assault victim more than when presenting themselves as competent.  
This finding was conceptually replicated in Study 3; participants evaluated an individual 
reporting low (versus high) victim-blaming as more competent.  Study 4 found that 
when evaluating an individual for a leadership position, a low victim-blaming candidate 
was rated as both more suitable and more competent than a high victim-blaming 
candidate.  Moreover, these findings are bolstered by the findings in Studies 2 and 3 that 
participants reported greater agreement with an ostensible prior participant who 
indicated low levels of victim-blaming.  
These findings related to descriptive norms in victim blaming were contrary to 
expectations inferred from the literature.  It was expected that due to victim-blaming’s 
link with factors that have been previously shown to be normative within Western 
culture (e.g., internal locus of control, belief in a just world, self-sufficiency; Alves & 
Correia, 2008; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005; Jellison & Green, 1981; Stern & Manifold, 
1977), focusing on a victim’s personal responsibility would be seen as a useful or 
effective interpretation of the event.  Had this hypothesis been supported, it would have 
suggested a descriptive norm to engage in victim-blaming.   
Exploratory analyses in the Pilot and Study 1 also investigated whether belief in 
free will predicted the degree to which participants endorsed victim-blaming.  The 
concept of free will incorporates some aspects of personal responsibility.  Individuals 
who endorse free will tend to believe that we have control over the decisions that we 
make: events do not happen by chance (Monroe, Brady, & Malle, 2016).  Similarly, a 
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focus on personal responsibility stresses the role that people play in determining their 
own outcomes.  Therefore, I used the FAD+ (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) as a proxy for 
belief in personal responsibility.  As I posited that a norm to engage in victim-blaming 
might stem from a focus on personal responsibility, it was expected that belief in free 
will would be associated with higher levels of victim-blaming, particularly within the 
control conditions.  While the relationship between belief in free will and victim-
blaming is an area yet to be fully explored, there is some prior research which might 
suggest a positive association between the two (Clark et al., 2014, Ogletree, 2014; 
Savani, Stephens, & Markus, 2011).  For example, Savani et al. (2011) found that after 
making the concept of choice salient, participants engaged in more than victim-blaming 
than a control condition.  Contrary to expectations, in both the Pilot and Study 1, belief 
in free will was not associated with victim-blaming and this finding was similar whether 
examining participant responses as a whole or within each condition.   
Interestingly, when participants were asked to complete a victim-blaming 
questionnaire with no further instruction (i.e., control conditions in the Pilot and Study 
1), they reported significantly more derogation and dissociation as compared to 
attribution of responsibility.  A similar pattern was found for the positive self-
presentation conditions (i.e., likeable and competent conditions); participants indicated 
significantly more derogation and dissociation than attribution of responsibility.  This 
pattern suggests that outright blaming is perceived as particularly undesirable and that 
participants are engaging in alternative and perhaps more subtle forms of victim-
blaming.  Moreover, this hesitancy to engage in explicit blaming speaks to social 
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desirability issues revolving around victim evaluations.  The results of these studies 
suggest that victim-blaming is generally seen as undesirable, participants may be 
reluctant to respond in ways that might suggest that they, themselves, are condoning 
negative evaluations of victims.  If this is so, it would provide additional evidence for a 
prescriptive norm against victim-blaming.  However, it may also indicate that 
participants may be exaggerating their responses in such a way to distance themselves 
from blaming behavior.  While this may be less of a concern for the experimental 
conditions within the self-presentation paradigm, this could present a problem for the 
control condition (self-presentation paradigm) or when making evaluations regarding the  
victim-blaming responses of a third party.   
7.1 Limitations and Future Directions 
While these studies provide valuable insight into how people may be thinking 
about both victims and as well as those who engaging in victim-blaming, there are 
methodological issues that should be considered.  The paradigms used in these studies 
may not have been an appropriate method for capturing descriptive norms.  While 
descriptive norms are informational in that we may refer to them to determine the most 
effective course of action, they are fundamentally about perceptions of the frequency of 
a particular behavior.  People may subsequently interpret a particular behavior or attitude 
as effective or competent because it is a common response to a specific situation.  
Asking participants to present as (in)competent or to evaluate the competence of another 
individual based on his/her responses may not necessarily reflect perceptions of 
frequency, but rather be an alternative method of ascertaining the social value of a 
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particular behavior or attitude.  Dubois and Beauvois (2005) suggest that a behavior, 
attitude, or trait’s social value can be determined by two independent dimensions:  social 
desirability and social utility.  From this perspective, the current results regarding 
competence may better reflect prescriptive rather than descriptive norms, albeit using an 
alternative measure.  Future research could adapt the current paradigms to better address 
the presence of descriptive norms regarding victim-blaming.  For example, an adaptation 
of the self-presentation paradigm could ask participants to complete a victim-blaming 
questionnaire in the way they expect that most people would.  Similarly, the judge’s 
paradigm might be modified to ask participants to estimate how common a particular 
response is. 
A notable limitation of these studies is the large number of participants who did 
not complete the studies as instructed.   Despite this limitation, the general pattern of 
results was largely the same when participants who did not follow the instructions were 
excluded from analysis.  This limitation could be addressed by modifying the current 
methods.  With respect to the self-presentation paradigm, it is possible that participants 
were hesitant to respond to a victim-blaming questionnaire in a way that either presented 
themselves in a negative light or deviated too far from their own perspective.  For 
example, when asked for feedback on the study, one participant reported, “This study 
made me think and a little bit uncomfortable because of how I had to respond.” This 
might be remedied by asking participants to respond to the questionnaire from a third 
person perspective.  That is, instead of asking participants to complete the questionnaire 
in a way to get others to like them, they might be asked to complete it in a way that 
 69 
 
 
another person would if he/she was trying to make a good impression on others.  
Another option might be to ask the participant to respond to the questionnaire twice: 
once in terms of their own beliefs and then in a way to present themselves in a certain 
light.   
In terms of the judge’s paradigm, participants may have had difficulty separating 
their evaluations of the ostensible prior participant from their perceptions of the victim 
herself.  This is evidenced by the response of a participant after being asked who he/she 
had evaluated in the study, “A mixture of both, taking into account both person’s 
personalities and inputs.”  Future studies might ask participants to appraise both the 
evaluation target, as well as the victim or to indicate the extent to which most people 
would approve of the given responses.   
Alternatively, these issues might be explained by a simple failure to completely 
read and understand the instructions.  While instructions were reiterated to the 
participant several times, participants are accustomed to completing questionnaires from 
their own perspective, rather than with a specific and explicit motivation.  For example, 
one participant in the pilot reported, “It was sort of hard for me to answer in a way that 
made me likeable instead of just honest at first.”  Further, evaluating a third party based 
on his/her responses to questionnaire is likely a new experience.  While efforts were 
made at the start of each session to ensure that participants understood the instructions 
(e.g., research assistants were asked to read aloud a script describing the tasks and what 
participants were being asked to do prior the start of the study), in the future other steps 
might be taken to ensure participants understand the task.  For example, after reviewing 
 70 
 
 
the study instructions, participants might take a brief quiz to indicate that they 
understand the task.  Although participants would, no doubt, find this process tedious, it 
could potentially ensure that they complete the study as intended.   
Despite some limitations, this research provides several additional potential 
avenues for future investigations regarding social norms surrounding victim-blaming.  
First, it suggests a need for more qualitative responses into victim-blaming.  Allowing 
participants an opportunity to freely respond to both scenarios involving victimization or 
to the responses of a third party can serve to contextualize and enrich data that is 
provided by more typical Likert-type measures.  These qualitative responses have the 
potential to offer illuminating information regarding the complex, and sometimes 
conflicting, responses people may have to victims and their situations.  For example, one 
recurring theme in participant free responses rejected victim-blaming, while 
simultaneously invoking ideas of personal responsibility.  For example, one participant 
commented, “It is not her fault she was sexually assaulted.  There is a possibility she 
was flirty and should have been more conservative but when a girl says no she should 
not be ignored, especially when it comes to sexual activity” (Study 2).  Another reported, 
“While the assault was not her fault in any way, she could have avoided the situation by 
not going upstairs or even not going to the party” (Study 4).  Examining qualitative 
responses to controversial or difficult topics such as these may be an effective method of 
exploring the prevalence of victim-blaming attitudes and beliefs.  Moreover, these 
methods may uncover the conflict that may arise when participants attempt to respond in 
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socially desirable ways, but are also inclined to hold victims, at least partially, 
responsible.   
Second, it is important to investigate whether these patterns of responses 
generalize to victims from different backgrounds or across different types of victim 
scenarios.  Future research should also address whether the role of race/ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, or other group identities might influence the extent to which these norms are 
applied.  Prior research suggests that sexual assault is evaluated as less severe when it is 
experienced by Black women.  Further, Black women who have survived sexual assault 
are less likely to be believed and tend to be blamed more for their assault (Donovan, 
2007).  Thus, prescriptive norms against victim-blaming may not apply equally to 
women of all backgrounds.  Furthermore, there is a great deal of media attention directed 
towards sexual assault.  This relatively recent awareness may be driving prescriptive 
norms against victim-blaming and it is unclear whether negative evaluations of victims 
in other scenarios (e.g., poverty, police brutality) are perceived as victim-blaming in the 
wider population.  The current findings could be extended by examining whether there 
are social norms regarding victim-blaming in other situations and if these patterns are 
similar to those found here.   
7.2 Implications  
While it is clear that victim-blaming is perceived as undesirable and counter-
normative, these studies were not designed to examine what, if any, ramifications might 
occur as a result of norm violation.  As prescriptive norms are aligned with broad social 
values, individuals who disregard these norms are often subject to some form of social 
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sanction (Alves & Correia, 2010; Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993).   Exploring 
behavioral responses to the violation of these norms might give insight into the 
importance placed upon them.  Interestingly, Study 5 provides preliminary evidence that 
engaging in victim-blaming may not always lead to severe consequences.  Results found 
that victim-blaming had a larger effect on a candidate who was not particularly qualified.  
In contrast, for a high-quality candidate, engaging in victim-blaming did decrease 
evaluations of suitability, but not to the same extent.  Moreover, ratings of suitability for 
well qualified, but high victim-blaming candidates remained above the scale midpoint.  
This suggests that if an individual is highly qualified, violation social norms, at least for 
victim-blaming, may not be a deal breaker.   
The results of this research extend our knowledge of when and why victim-
blaming may occur. Prior research suggests that victim-blaming occurs as a response to 
either a threat to personal safety (e.g., “If it could happen to her, it could happen to me) 
or to worldview (e.g., “If these types of events happen, maybe the world isn’t so 
predictable.”).  In contrast, a social norms perspective investigates whether there are 
additional cultural and societal factors that might guide how we evaluate and attempt to 
explain circumstances in which someone is victimized.  How we think about individuals 
who engage in victim-blaming or endorse negative attitudes towards victims can tell us 
whether victim-blaming has social value and, if so, the type(s) of social value it holds 
(e.g., desirability, utility).   
There are also implications for both interventions and educational programs 
regarding victimization and sexual assault.  These findings suggest that victim-blaming 
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is generally negatively received: it is not seen as a particularly appropriate response to 
victims.  This may suggest a changing climate in terms of how we think about and 
evaluate victims and their situations.  With continuing media attention to victimization 
and education programs (e.g., the Center for Disease Control’s Rape Prevention and 
Education Program; Texas A&M’s Step In Stand Up Program), individuals may be 
attempting to empathize more with victims.  This work suggests that researchers and 
educators interested in addressing the prevalence of victim-blaming should also consider 
that due to social desirability, victim-blaming may take more subtle forms and that 
individuals may have difficulty identifying attitudes or behaviors that reinforce negative 
evaluations of victims.  Thus, information provided during these interventions needs to 
clearly demonstrate the negative impact that these subtle, ambiguous forms of victim-
blaming may have on victims.  While the studies herein did not find evidence that 
victim-blaming is descriptively normative, it does provide a starting point and useful 
information for the design of future investigations.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
STUDY INSTRUCTIONS [PILOT, STUDY 1] 
Instructions for the Control Condition: 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY 
On the following page, you will be presented with a short description of an individual 
and an event in his/her life.  Afterwards, we would like for you to evaluate the person 
and the situation. 
 
Instructions for the Norm Conditions 
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY 
This study is a little bit different than most studies that you have completed before. On 
the following page, you will be presented with a short description of an individual and 
an event in his/her life. Afterwards, we would like for you to evaluate the person and the 
situation. 
 
Likeable Condition: 
However, instead of answering according to your perspective, we would like for 
you to respond to the questions in a way that conveys a positive image of 
yourself. That is, please fill out the questions in the way that you would if you 
were attempting to get the person who was going to read your answers to 
like and approve of you. 
 
Unlikeable Condition: 
However, instead of answering according to your perspective, we would like for 
you to respond to the questions in a way that conveys a negative image of 
yourself. That is, please fill out the questions in the way that you would if you 
were attempting to get the person who was going to read your answers to 
dislike and disapprove of you. 
 
Competent Condition: 
However, instead of answering according to your perspective, we would like for 
you to respond to the questions in a way that conveys a competent image of 
yourself. That is, please fill out the questions in the way that you would if you 
were attempting to get the person who was going to read your answers to 
perceive you as competent, effective, and efficient.  
 
Incompetent Condition: 
However, instead of answering according to your perspective, we would like for 
you to respond to the questions in a way that conveys an incompetent image of 
yourself. That is, please fill out the questions in the way that you would if you 
were attempting to get the person who was going to read your answers to 
perceive you as incompetent, ineffective, and inefficient.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
VICTIM-BLAMING VIGNETTE 
 
CRIME ALERT: Off-campus sexual assault reported 
 
DATE: November 12, 2012 
 
SUBJECT: Off-campus sexual assault  
 
Campus crime alerts and timely warnings to the community comply with the federal 
Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act (Clery Act). 
 
On November 12, 2012, the Campus Police Department was notified by the local police 
department of a sexual assault that occurred in their city at approximately 11:45 pm on 
Saturday, November 10. 
 
A student reported to the police department that she had been sexually assaulted while at 
a party with friends Saturday evening (Nov. 10). The victim told authorities that she met 
the suspect while at the party and after chatting for several hours, agreed to go upstairs to 
‘continue talking.’  After entering an upstairs bedroom, the suspect locked the door and 
began to remove the victim’s clothing.  The victim reported that she attempted to leave 
the room, but was pinned down and sexually assaulted. 
 
The identity of the suspect in the case is known and the police department is 
investigating. 
 
Students are always encouraged to provide campus and city police with any information 
that might aid in solving a crime. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
VICTIM-BLAMING MEASURES [PILOT, STUDY 1] 
 
ADAPTED FROM GOLDENBERG & FORGAS (2012) AND HAFER (2000B) 
 
Blame/Responsibility 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. She is responsible for what happened. 
2. She could have avoided the assault. 
3. She had control over being assaulted 
4. I feel sorry for her. 
5. She could have prevented the assault. 
6. Her behavior is responsible for the assault. 
7. She is to blame for the assault. 
8. I believe what happened to her was caused by her own behavior 
9. I believe she is responsible herself for what happened. 
10. I think she deserved what happened to her. 
 
Derogation 
The woman described in the report is… 
1. Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unintelligent 
2. Competent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Incompetent 
3. Likeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unlikeable 
4. Responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Irresponsible 
5. Careful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Careless 
6. Honest  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonest 
7. Modest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Arrogant 
 
What is your overall impression of the woman described in the report? 
Extremely  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
Positive        Negative 
 
Dissociation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I would consider hanging out with this person. 
2. I would consider studying or working with this person. 
3. I would consider partying with this person. 
4. In general, I identify with this person. 
5. This incident could happen to me or a close friend. 
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6. In general, I am similar to this person 
 
Do you have any other comments that you’d like to share about the woman described in 
the story or the incident? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
Manipulation Check [Pilot, Study 1] 
 
When you responded to the questions about the person described in the report, how did 
you respond? 
1. In a way to make the person who would read my answers like and approve of 
me 
2. In a way to make the person who would read my answers dislike and disapprove 
of me. 
3. In a way to make the person who would read my answers see me as competent 
and effective [STUDY 1] 
4. In a way to make the person who would read my answers see me as incompetent 
and ineffective [STUDY 1] 
5. The way that the average person would. 
6. The way that I felt about the victim and her situation. 
7. In no particular way. 
 
 
Manipulation Check [Study 2, Study 3] 
 
When you completed the questionnaire, were you evaluating the person described in the 
report or the person who filled out the questionnaire? 
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APPENDIX E 
 
FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM SCALE                                             
 
(FAD-PLUS; PAULHUS & CAREY, 2011) [PILOT, STUDY 1] 
 
 
Instructions:   
[Experimental Conditions:  While earlier in the study you were asked to respond to 
questions in a particular way, we would like for your honest response for the remaining 
questions.] 
 
We’d like you to answer a few questions about yourself. Read each of the following 
statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your attitudes, beliefs 
and experiences. 
There are no right or wrong answers here.  Your first responses are usually the most 
accurate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. (Fatalistic Determinism) 
2. People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. (Scientific 
Determinism) 
3. Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. (Unpredictability) 
4. People have complete control over the decisions they make. (Free Will)  
5. No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. (Fatalistic Determinism) 
6. Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior. 
(Scientific Determinism) 
7. No one can predict what will happen in this world. (Unpredictability) 
8. People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make.  (Free Will) 
9. Fate already has a plan for everyone. (Fatalistic Determinism) 
10. Your genes determine your future. (Scientific Determinism) 
11. Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 
(Unpredictability) 
12. People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to.  (Free Will) 
13. Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. (Fatalistic 
Determinism) 
14. Science has shown how your past environment created your current intelligence and  
      personality. (Scientific Determinism) 
15. People are unpredictable. (Unpredictability) 
16. Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do.  (Free Will) 
17. Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. (Fatalistic 
Determinism) 
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18. As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. (Scientific 
Determinism) 
19. Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. (Unpredictability) 
20. Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. (Unpredictability) 
21. People have complete free will.  (Free Will) 
22. Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. (Scientific 
Determinism) 
23. People are always at fault for their bad behavior.  (Free Will) 
24. Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. (Scientific 
Determinism) 
25. What happens to people is a matter of chance. (Unpredictability) 
26. Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. (Free Will) 
27. People’s futures cannot be predicted. (Unpredictability) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AMBIVALENT SEXISM  
 
AND VICTIM-BLAMING [STUDY 1] 
 
In order to examine if hostile or benevolent sexism differentially influenced 
victim-blaming between conditions, Study 2 additionally asked participants to complete 
the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.  The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & 
Fisk, 1996) asks participants to indicate their agreement with 22 statements which reflect 
two independent, but related, forms of sexism.  The first, hostile sexism, (HS; α=.86, 
M=3.71, SD=1.04) measures antipathy towards women (e.g., “women are too easily 
offended”).  The second, benevolent sexism (BS; α=.77, M=3.99, SD=.87), measures the 
extent to which individuals perceive women positively, but sympathetically.  BS stresses 
adherence to gender stereotypes or gender roles (e.g., “women should be cherished and 
protected by men”).  Responses were given on a 7-point scale, where higher scores 
indicated greater endorsement of hostile or benevolent sexism. 
To examine these relationships, bivariate correlations were conducted to examine 
the relationship between hostile sexism and benevolent sexism and victim-blaming 
separately for each condition (see table below).  Interestingly, hostile sexism appeared to 
be positively related to victim-blaming in both the control and when presenting in a 
positive way (i.e., when presenting as likeable or competent).  However, when 
presenting in a negative way (i.e., when presenting as unlikeable or incompetent), it was 
negatively associated with victim-blaming.  Benevolent sexism was also positively 
correlated with attribution of responsibility and dissociation, but only when participants 
were asked to respond in a way to appear competent.  Together, these results suggest that 
beliefs about women may shift perceptions of appropriate and effective evaluations of 
victims.  Individuals higher in hostile sexism, and to a lesser extent benevolent sexism, 
may perceive higher levels of victim-blaming as more appropriate and desirable.   
 
 
 
Correlations between hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and victim-blaming, Study 1 
Condition Responsibility Derogation Dissociation 
Overall    
 Hostile Sexism  .11
† 
.04 .03 
 Benevolent Sexism  .08 .03 .06 
Control 
 Hostile Sexism  .35
* 
 .35
* 
.22 
 Benevolent Sexism  .19 -.002 .20 
Likeable 
 Hostile Sexism    .31
** 
.13 .16 
 Benevolent Sexism  .18 .10 .10 
Unlikeable 
 Hostile Sexism -.26
† 
-.24
†
 -.35
* 
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Unlikeable Responsibility Derogation Dissociation 
 Benevolent Sexism  .11 -.01 -.08 
Competent 
 Hostile Sexism   .59
** 
  .45
** 
   .59
** 
 Benevolent Sexism    .33
** 
.19    .35
** 
Incompetent 
 Hostile Sexism                    -.15 -.35
** 
-.44
** 
 Benevolent Sexism                     -.05 -.03 .07 
† p ≤ .093 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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APPENDIX G 
 
STUDY INSTRUCTIONS [STUDY 2, STUDY 3] 
 
In this study, we are interested in people's first impressions when reading about events 
and how we go about forming impressions of others. 
 
You will read a short description of an event that occurred in someone's life. After 
reading about the event, you will see how another individual (the respondent) evaluated 
the person described. We would like to learn about your impressions of the respondent 
based on how he/she responded to the questionnaire. That is, we are interested in your 
impression of the respondent (the person who completed the questionnaire), not the 
person described in the story. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
VICTIM-BLAMING MANIPULATION [STUDY 2, STUDY 3, STUDY 4] 
 
Instructions [Study 2, Study 3]: 
In an earlier version of this study, we asked individuals to evaluate the person described 
in the story you just read. We would like for you to review one of the completed 
questionnaires and form an impression of the person based on his/her answers. 
 
On your desk is a packet containing the evaluation. Please take a moment to think about 
how the person responded to the questionnaires and then answer the questions below. 
 
High victim-blaming condition: 
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Moderate victim-blaming condition: 
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Low victim-blaming condition: 
 
 97 
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APPENDIX I 
 
DEPENDENT MEASURES [STUDY 2, STUDY 3] 
 
FISK, CUDDY, & GLICK, 2007; FISK, XU, CUDDY, & GLICK, 1999 
 
Thinking about the respondent as a person, please indicate the extent to which each trait 
describes the respondent. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
The respondent is… 
 
1. Ambitious    8.  Kind  15.  Naïve  22.  Irritating 
2. Cold     9.  Competitive   16.  Polite  23. Responsible 
3. Industrious    10.  Helpful  17.  Determined  24.Sincere 
4. Nice     11.  Lazy  18.  Hypocritical 25.  Hard-working 
5. Competent    12.  Open  19.  Persevering 26.  Likeable 
6. Good-natured    13.  Confident 20.  Pretentious 27.  Unstable 
7. Intelligent    14.  Honest  21.  Dynamic  28.  Tolerant 
 
What is your overall impression of the respondent? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Extremely 
Negative 
   
    
Extremely 
Positive 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1. I would consider hanging out with the respondent. 
2. I would consider studying or working with the respondent. 
3. I would consider partying with this respondent. 
4. In general, I identify with the respondent. 
5. This incident described in the vignette could happen to me or a close friend. 
6. In general, I agree with the respondent's evaluation. 
 
 
Do you have any other comments you’d like to share about the respondent? 
 
 
Do you have any other comments you’d like to share about the person described in the 
story? 
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APPENDIX J 
 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO ACCOMPANY  
 
VICTIM-BLAMING MANIPULATION [STUDY 3, STUDY 4] 
 
High Victim-blaming Condition: 
Comments: 
The girl voluntarily went into the bedroom with this suspect. How is she not in some sort 
of way to blame?! Yes, she did not know this was going to happen, but she made the 
decision to go upstairs.  I believe that she put herself into a situation that never has good 
outcomes.  I don’t think that anyone deserves something like that, but she did kind of ask 
for it. 
 
Low Victim-blaming Condition: 
Comments: 
The girl voluntarily went into the bedroom with this suspect. But, she is not in any way to 
blame. She did not know this was going to happen, even though she made the decision to 
go upstairs.  I believe that he put her into a situation that never has good outcomes.  I 
don’t think that anyone deserves something like that. She bears no responsibility for the 
incident. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF EVALUATION TARGET 
 
Age: _18_ 
 
 
Gender: Female Male  Prefer to say 
 
 
Please indicate your race/ethnicity (select all that apply): 
 Asian/Asian-American 
 Black/African-American 
 Latino/Hispanic 
 Native American/American Indian 
 White/Caucasian 
 Not listed (please specify: ____________________________________________) 
 
 
Year in school: 
o Freshman (1st year) 
o Sophomore (2nd year) 
o Junior (3rd year) 
o Senior (4th year or above) 
o Graduate Student 
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APPENDIX L 
 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AMBIVALENT SEXISM  
 
AND TARGET RATINGS [STUDY 3] 
 
Study 3 additionally asked participants to complete the Ambivalent Sexism 
Inventory (Glick & Fisk, 1996) in order to examine if ratings of targets were additionally 
influenced by either hostile (α=.90, M=3.60, SD=1.11) or benevolent sexism (α=.78, 
M=3.99, SD=.86).  Bivariate correlations were conducted to examine the relationship 
between hostile sexism and benevolent sexism and victim-blaming separately for each 
condition.  Results indicated that neither hostile sexism (ps≥.163), nor benevolent 
sexism (ps≥.215) were significantly related to liking or competence ratings in any of the 
conditions (see table below).  
 
 
Correlations between victim-blaming, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism, Study 3 
 Condition 
 Low victim-blaming High victim-blaming 
 Female target Male target Female target Male target 
Hostile sexism     
 Liking -.25 -.13 -.05 .22 
 Competence -.10 -.22 .09 .21 
Benevolent sexism      
 Liking .02 -.02 .19 .08 
 Competence .22 -.13 -.25 .13 
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APPENDIX M 
 
NOMINEE APPLICATION MATERIALS [STUDY 4] 
 
Position Posting: 
 
Nominations open for the Chief Justice of the TAMU Student Government Association 
The process for electing a new Chief Justice for the Texas A&M University Judicial 
Court is underway.  Interested individuals should submit their application materials by 
Tuesday, May 3, 2016 at 5:00pm.  Materials will be evaluated by officers in all three 
branches of the Texas A&M Student Government Association in the Summer of 2016.  
Vetted candidates will appear on the Fall 2016 ballot and will take office in Fall 2017.   
 
About the Judicial Court:  The Judicial Court is one of three branches of the Texas A&M 
University Student Government.  The Judicial Court's duties include constitutional 
interpretation, legislative interpretation, election regulation, and conflict resolution as 
granted by the Student Government Association Constitution and the University Rules 
and Regulations. The Student Government Association Judicial Court shall have original 
jurisdiction extending to all cases arising under the Student Government Association 
Constitution and By-Laws and Student Senate legislation and to cases involving any 
member of the Student Government Association. Each student shall be protected by 
equal justice under the Student Government Association governing documents, and 
openness in all proceedings involving the Judicial Court.  
 
Role of the Chief Justice:  The Chief Justice is responsible for presiding over all hearings 
and meetings that the Judicial Court has. They are responsible for scheduling all 
hearings that the Court may have, as well as determines the time and place for them to 
be conducted. If requested the Chief Justice will call Pre-Trial Hearings, during which 
the Court will determine whether or not an appeal warrants an official Hearing. The 
Chief Justice attends all meetings and hearings of the Court as well as all Senate 
meetings. Appropriate candidates will take office upon receiving a nomination by a 
member of the student senate, approval by the Student Body President, and 
Confirmation by the Student Body President, and Confirmation by two-thirds of the 
Student Senate.  
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Nominee Resume (high quality): 
JAMES GILB 
 
EDUCATION: 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX  Expected May 2018 
B.A., Political Science, Pre-Law Track  
Certificate in Foundations of Political Theory 
GPA:  3.87 
  
 
RELEVANT EXPERIENCE: 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 
Associate Justice, Texas A&M University Judicial Court 3/2016 – Present  
 Attend judicial hearings 
 Evaluate arguments from all parties involved in hearings in accordance 
with the Student Government Association Constitution and University 
Rules and Regulations 
 Render an opinion regarding evidence and information given during 
judicial hearings 
 
Texas A&M University, College Station Texas 
Judicial Advocate, Texas A&M University Judicial Court 8/2015 – 3/2016 
 Assist and provide counsel to students involved in judiciary hearings 
 Prepare documentation, evidence, and arguments in judiciary hearings 
 
 
COLLEGIATE AND COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE: 
Texas A&M Historical Society    10/2014 – Present 
Pre-Law Society, Texas A&M University   2/2015 – Present 
Texas A&M Moot Court     8/2015 - Present 
Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society 3/2016 - Present 
 
 
AWARDS AND HONORS: 
University Honors Program, Texas A&M University 2014 - Present 
Dean’s Honor Roll, Texas A&M University  2014 – Present 
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Nominee Resume (low quality): 
JAMES GILB 
 
 
EDUCATION: 
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX  Expected May 2018 
B.A., Political Science, Pre-Law Track  
Certificate in Foundations of Political Theory 
GPA:  2.87 
  
 
RELEVANT EXPERIENCE: 
HEB, College Station, TX 
Cashier       10/2014 – Present  
 Process customer payments by cash, debit, gift, and credit card 
 Address any customer issues or complaints 
 Ensure management of daily cash accounts 
 Process exchanges and refunds 
 
YMCA, Dallas, Texas 
Referee for youth soccer      3/2011 – 6/2014 
 Officiate matches according YMCA regulations 
 Keep record of matches 
 Insect sporting equipment to ensure compliance with safety regulations 
 Attend referee training courses 
 
 
COLLEGIATE AND COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE: 
Texas A&M Historical Society    10/2014 – Present 
Pre-Law Club, Texas A&M University   2/2015 – Present 
Pi Sigma Alpha      3/2016 – Present 
 
 
AWARDS AND HONORS: 
Dean’s Honor Roll, Texas A&M UniversitySpring, 2013 
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Distractor Situation: 
 
SITUATION ONE  
A woman was near death from cancer. One drug might save her, a form of radium that a 
druggist had recently discovered. The druggist was charging $2,000, ten times what the 
drug cost him to make. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to 
borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the 
druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him to sell it 
cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No.” The husband got desperate and 
broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife.  
 
We’d like for you to think about what you just read.  Specifically, we’d like for you 
think about the man (Heinz) described in the report and the incident. For the questions 
below, please evaluate Heinz and his decision. 
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APPENDIX N 
 
DEPENDENT MEASURES [STUDY 4] 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at 
all 
  Unsure   Completely 
 
1. How suitable do you think this potential nominee would be for the position of Chief       
Justice? 
2. How successful do you think this potential nominee would be if he/she were elected                                    
to the position of Chief Justice? 
3. How fair do you think this potential nominee is? 
4. How reasonable do you think this potential nominee is? 
5. How intelligent do you think the potential nominee is? 
6. How competent do you think the potential nominee is? 
7. Do you think this person makes good decisions? 
8. Would you support the nomination of this person to the position of Chief Justice? 
 
What additional comments do you have? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
